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Pilgrimage to the Perennial Philosophy

The Case of Aldous Huxley

CHAD WALSH*

I

ALDOUS HUXLEY was predestined by family background to become either a scientist or a writer. His father was Leonard Huxley, the gifted biographer, historian, and philologist who for many years edited *The Cornhill Magazine*. His paternal grandfather was that scientific giant of the nineteenth century, Thomas Henry Huxley, one of the greatest biologists of the Victorian era and the most famous crusader for the then new-fangled doctrine of evolution. His neat demolition of Gladstone and Bishop Wilberforce is still remembered as a classic of the "evolution-versus-religion" furore.

To continue with Aldous Huxley's family tree, he is the nephew of Mrs. Humphrey Ward, author of super-romantic and immensely popular novels; and he is the grand-nephew of no less a literary figure than Matthew Arnold. Finally, no picture of Aldous Huxley's background is complete without mention of his elder brother, Julian, who is not only an outstanding biologist but

has become famous for his popularization of the idea of the scientific utopia. He has recently been in the headlines as executive secretary of the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).

With such an heredity and environment, it is not surprising that Aldous Huxley turned to science or literature (as a matter of record he turned to both). The only startling fact, and the one that could not have been predicted by the most discerning sociologist or psychologist, is that in his mid-forties he was destined to turn also to mysticism, and that since his conversion he was to be one of a small group in California busily writing books to win as many people as possible over to the "perennial philosophy" as a way of life.

Huxley's early life can be briefly summarized, because it conforms so neatly to the pattern of upper-middle-class English mores. He was born 26 July 1894. In 1908 he went to Eton with the intention of becoming a doctor. He began to specialize in biology—as is very obvious to anyone who notes the scientifically exact physiological passages in his novels. The first of two turning points in his life came when he was seventeen. He contracted keratitis, and within a few months was almost totally blind—a condition that lasted for two and a half years. It was obvious that he would never be able to see well enough to resume his scientific studies. He turned to the other career that his background made logical: that of a writer. He learned to

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use a typewriter, and typed out a complete novel, but lost the manuscript before he regained the partial use of his eyes.

After his sight had improved sufficiently for him to read, Huxley went to Balliol College at Oxford to study English literature and philology. He received his degree in 1915, and lost no time in publishing his first book—a collection of poems, *The Burning Wheel*, which appeared in 1916. Since that time he has written well over thirty books—novels, poetry, collections of short stories, treatises on social and philosophic subjects. No other author of the period has been more completely the man of letters, or put himself on the record more lucidly.

The New Yorker has accurately styled Huxley "one of the few English-speaking novelists now operating who actually appears to be decently educated." He has an enormous backlog of reading to draw on, and he possesses an incredibly large vocabulary, which he uses with the economy and sober exactness of an eighteenth-century member of the French Academy. Few prose stylists can approach him. But it is not my intention to discuss him here as a literary figure. I am concerned with him as a possible straw in the wind of intellectual and philosophic movements. What were the stages in his pilgrimage from the ideal of the well-balanced "Hellenic man" to that of the mystic who is seeking union with God? Why should the grandson of Thomas Henry Huxley have made this astounding pilgrimage?

II

One thing emerges very clearly from Huxley's earliest books: he was fascinated by religion. Fascinated, but not sympathetic. He generally chose to ridicule any manifestation of religion, whether it was Christianity or Oriental mysticism, but he could not get it off his mind.

Take, for example, that brilliant and brittle collection of poetry called *Leda*, published in 1920. One of the poems, "From the Pillar," deals with Simeon, the famous stylite of the

fifth century who achieved a reputation for sanctity by living on top of a column. The poem depicts the saint atop his lofty perch, watching the "wine-drenched riot of harlots and human beasts" disporting themselves in the city below, and concludes with this cynical reflection:

And the saint from his high fastness
Of purity apart
Cursed them and their unchasteness,
And envied them in his heart.

"Ninth Philosopher's Song," another poem in the same collection, is a neat jibe at the sweetness-and-light concept of religion. The first stanza reads:

God's in His Heaven: He never issues
(Wise Man!) to visit this world of ours.
Unchecked the cancer gnaws our tissues,
Stops to lick chops and then again devours.

These versified wise-cracks in themselves do not indicate any profound feeling toward religion; they might have been composed by any bright undergraduate desirous of shocking Aunt Emma. It is in Huxley's first published novel, *Crome Yellow*, that we begin to realize how incessantly thoughts of religion are flitting through his brain.

Crome Yellow, which saw print in 1921, is still amazingly readable for a book written so early in its author's career. It is a peculiar mixture of mellowness and cynicism. Details of the sex life of the characters share space with long reflections on life and philosophy. Several of the characters are deeply immersed in religions of assorted varieties. There is Mr. Bodiham, the local rector, who believes that the Book of Revelation has been fulfilled by World War I, and the apocalyptic return of Christ can be expected any day. He preaches sermons to that effect, and suffers the double disappointment of seeing his congregation yawn and the day of wrath inexplicably refuse to arrive. Then there is Mrs. Wimbush, whose fondness for the races has obliged her husband to put her on a betting allowance of forty pounds a month so as to safeguard the family fortune. She is a devout student of horo-

scopes, and spends a good deal of time meditating on New Thought and the Occult. She is encouraged by Mr. Barbecue-Smith, who obtains the inspiration for his uplifting articles by staring at a light until he reaches a quasi-mystical state. In conclusion, one must not forget Ivor, whose principal occupation is the conquest of the more attractive girls at the various country homes he visits, but who occasionally takes time out to draw pictures of the beings he has seen in the spirit world.

Antic Hay, a novel which appeared in 1923, is considerably grimmer than *Crome Yellow*. It is perhaps the cruelest picture of the Bohemian life of the 1920's that any English or American novelist has written. The characters, almost without exception, eat, drink, go to bed, and try to be merry, but the harder they try, the more they resemble the damned souls in the *Inferno*.

Huxley's loathing for his characters and the futile sensuality of their lives, raises the book at times to the heights of prophetic grandeur. Some of the episodes are almost too painful to read—for example, the night-club scene, where a hideous play dealing with a misshapen and unwanted baby is presented before an audience of the ultra-sophisticated. It is one of the characteristics of Huxley's genius that the more he hates, the more lucid his style becomes; never has the modern perversion and atrophy of the human spirit been presented with more surgical exactness than in *Antic Hay*.

Mysticism and the Occult are lacking in the novel, but digs at Christianity abound. The opening scene shows the hero, Theodore Gumbriel Junior, attending chapel services at the school where he is employed. As he listens to the pompous drone of the service he is thinking about the hardness of the pews. Suddenly he has the bright idea of inventing pneumatic trousers for the benefit of the sedentary. He instantly resigns his position and goes forth into the world to make his fortune.

The hero's lack of reverence is reasonable enough; his father is "an atheist and an anti-

clerical of the strict old school," who habitually refers to the clergy as "black beetles." The strongest note of mockery is provided by a fierce, bearded man named Coleman, who expends an infinite amount of energy and ingenuity in finding opportunities for blasphemy. His conversation is a sort of perpetual black mass. Even when engaged in the standard occupation of Huxley's characters—seduction—he delays his triumph a few moments in order to ask the lady, "Do you believe in God?" She answers, "Not m-much," and he goes on to say, "I pity you. You must find existence dreadfully dull. As soon as you do, everything becomes a thousand times life-size. Phallic symbols five hundred feet high. . . . A row of grinning teeth you could run the hundred yards on. . . . It's only when you believe in God, and especially in hell, that you can really begin enjoying life."

It may be, of course, that Huxley was not giving his own views, that he was merely reporting what his characters said. However, the amount of space devoted to their brilliant blasphemies is significant. Even in the sacrilegious Twenties, religion was not quite such an omnipresent topic of conversation as it is in the pages of *Antic Hay*.

The fact is that Huxley was suffering from a split personality when he wrote his earlier novels. His conscious mind believed that life and the universe were completely devoid of meaning, but his intuition rebelled against the emptiness of such an outlook. Traces of this psychological struggle appear in *Jesting Pilate*, which came out only three years after *Antic Hay*. In this collection of essays Huxley tells of riding on a train in India and being disgusted by a holy man who hawked and spat all over the compartment. "For the rest of the journey," he writes, "I ruminated my anti-clericalism. . . . There is still, for my taste, too much kissing of amethyst rings as well as of slippered feet. There are still too many black coats in the West, too many orange ones in the East. *Écrasez l'infâme*. My travelling companion had made me, for the moment, a thorough-going Voltairian."

But he goes on to point out the limitations of anti-clericalism:

It is a simple creed, Voltairianism. In its simplicity lies its charm, lies the secret of its success—and also of its fallaciousness. For, in our muddled universe, nothing so simple can possibly be true, can conceivably "work."

If the *infâme* were squashed, if insecticide were scattered on all the clerical beetles, whether black or yellow, all would automatically be well. So runs the simple creed of the anti-clericals. It is too simple, and the assumptions on which it is based are too sweeping. For, to begin with, is the *infâme* always infamous, and are the beetles invariably harmful? Obviously not. Nor can it be said that the behaviour-value of pure rationalism (whatever the truth-value of its underlying assumptions) is necessarily superior to the behaviour-value of irrational beliefs which may be and, in general, almost certainly are untrue....

In other words, Huxley is confessing that he has based his philosophy of meaninglessness on reason, and now he is beginning to wonder whether reason is a sufficient guide to lead people to satisfactory lives.

He is beginning to wonder, but he is not willing to accept the Hindu's mystical attitude toward life. "Admirers of India are unanimous in praising Hindu 'spirituality,'" he says, but adds, "I cannot agree with them. To my mind 'spirituality'... is the primal curse of India and the cause of all her misfortunes. It is this preoccupation with 'spiritual' realities, different from the actual historical realities of common life, that has kept millions upon millions of men and women content, through centuries, with a lot unworthy of human beings."

Farther on in the same book Huxley says that the remedy for modern discontent is "more materialism and not, as false prophets from the East assert, more 'spirituality.' ... The Other World—the world of metaphysics and religion—can never possibly be as interesting as this world, and for an obvious reason. The Other World is an invention of the human fancy and shares the limitations of its creator."

Mysticism, then, is an invention of man, and reflects no ultimate reality, but elsewhere in the book Huxley admits that the illusion may

be good for the health: "We should make a habit of mysticism as well as of moral virtue. Leading a virtuous and reasonable life, practising the arts of meditation and recollection, we shall unbury all our hidden talents, shall attain in spite of circumstances to the happiness of serenity and integration, shall come, in a word, to be completely and perfectly ourselves."

The whole book is an invaluable reflection of its author's inner turmoil and confusion. Mysticism, he tells us in one breath, is based on illusions, and has the direst social consequences, but in the next breath he adds that it is a good road to the harmonious life. Amid all the contradictions of his attitude, one thing is obvious: his mind and his intuition are fighting it out. He is drawn toward mysticism though his mind is still convinced that it is a lot of hocus-pocus.

III

The climax of Huxley's pre-mystical period was reached in his novel, *Point Counter Point* (1928). Among Huxley's admirers who have been disconcerted by his leap into mysticism it is almost invariably the favorite, and rightly so. In it his mastery of technique is complete, and he presents his picture of the human comedy with overpowering effectiveness. Lacking the savageness of *Antic Hay*, the book is infinitely more depressing. Most of the characters are engaged in the familiar Huxleyan quest for happiness—particularly sexual happiness—and one puts down the book with the feeling that practically everyone has reached a dead end.

Several of the characters are of particular interest. One strongly suspects that the writer and artist, Mark Rampion, serves as Huxley's mouthpiece. Rampion is equally bitter against Jesus, who wanted men to live like angels, and the scientists, who want them to live like disembodied intellects. He believes that men should live on the human level, and glory in the richness of life itself. He could be called a humanist, if the word is given a sufficiently full-blooded connotation.

Several of the characters are religious. Rachel Quarles is a conventional Christian, and a rather dull soul, but Huxley's portrait of her is surprisingly gentle and understanding. Burlap, the editor of *The Literary World*, is brutally depicted as a pseudo-mystic and Christer; he is a more despicable version of the type represented by Mr. Barbecue-Smith in *Crome Yellow*.

Marjorie Carling, who has left her nauseatingly pious husband to become the mistress of a young writer, falls under the influence of Rachel Quarles, and evolves into a mystical Christian. One scene is of particular interest. Marjorie goes into a sort of mystical trance, which Huxley describes in such a way as to suggest that the girl was happily working herself into it. The final stages are thus pictured:

She felt as though she were melting into that green and golden tranquillity, sinking and being absorbed into it, dissolving out of separateness into union: stillness flowed into stillness, the silence without became one with the silence within her. The shaken and turbid liquor of existence grew gradually calm and all that had made it opaque—all the noise and uproar of the world, all the personal anxieties and desires and feelings—began to settle like a sediment, fell slowly, slowly and noiselessly, out of sight. The turbid liquor became clearer and clearer, more and more translucent. Behind that gradually vanishing mist was reality, was God. It was a slow, progressive revelation. "Peace, peace." She had no desires, no more preoccupations. The liquor which had been turbid was now quite clear, clearer than crystal, more diaphanous than air; the mist had vanished and the unveiled reality was a wonderful emptiness, was nothing. Nothing—the only perfection, the only absolute. Infinite and eternal nothing. The gradual revelation was now complete.

But the most vividly achieved portrait in *Point Counter Point* is that of Spandrell. He is a satanic person, whose greatest delight is to corrupt young women and then make them realize how debased they have become. The very intensity of the evil in his life has driven him into an interest in mysticism. He and Mark Rampion often clash. Spandrell defends asceticism as a means of attaining to mystical knowledge. "There are certain states

of consciousness known to ascetics that are unknown to people who aren't ascetics."

To this Rampion replies, "No doubt. And if you treat your body in the way nature meant you to, as an equal, you attain to states of consciousness unknown to the vivisectioning ascetics."

Spandrell argues, "But the states of the vivisectioners are better than the states of the indulgers."

Rampion retorts, "In other words, lunatics are better than sane men. Which I deny. The sane, harmonious, Greek man gets as much as he can of both sets of states. He's not such a fool as to want to kill part of himself. He strikes a balance."

Neither, of course, ever convinces the other.

I have spoken as though I assumed that Mark Rampion was the spokesman for the Huxley of 1928. Evidence for this is provided by the collection of essays, *Do What You Will*, which appeared in 1929 and advocated an ideal essentially the same as Rampion's: that is to say, the ideal of the well-balanced man, who develops all his potentialities, both physical and mental, to the fullest; the ideal of the so-called Greek man.

In one of these essays Huxley states, "What we need is a new Reformation, a Hellenic Reformation," and elsewhere he speaks of himself as a "life-worshipper." "The life-worshipper," he says, "is also, in his own way, a man of principles and consistency. To live intensely—that is his guiding principle. His diversity is a sign that he consistently tries to live up to his principles; for the harmony of life—of the single life that persists as a gradually changing unity through time—is a harmony built up of many elements. The unity is mutilated by the suppression of any part of the diversity. A fugue has need of all its voices."

This, then, is the Huxley of the late 1920's: a man who theoretically believed in the well-rounded, well-balanced life of the supposititious ancient Greeks, but who found himself increasingly drawn toward mysticism,

and its doctrine of mystical unity with God. The inner conflict was coming to a head.

IV

I shall touch very briefly on Huxley's next novel, *Brave New World*, which appeared in 1932. It is a masterpiece of satire, but has little to do with the history of Huxley's conversion to mysticism. Its chief significance is that it marks his definite break with the vision of the scientific utopia. He was not yet prepared to say what the right road is, but he knew that he had no intention of traveling the super-highway laid down by his brother, Julian.

Huxley's conversion to mysticism was a gradual process. It was the pathway of disillusionment, the realization that the harmonious, Hellenic man, for all the elegance and esthetic satisfaction of his life, is evading the final questions. Undoubtedly the plunge was hastened by his association with Gerald Heard in the early Thirties, when the two of them were associated in the British pacifist movement.

A word about Gerald Heard is needed at this point. His books, such as *The Creed of Christ*, *The Code of Christ*, and *The Eternal Gospel*, have made him one of the most widely read religious writers. He is not primarily concerned with Christianity as such. His viewpoint is that mysticism is the common denominator of all the great religions, and that Christ, like Buddha, was a mystic, intent on revealing to others the mystical way of life. Each religion takes on additional features—ritual, sacraments, etc.—but these are determined by historical circumstances. The one thing they have in common—and it is the essential thing—is the belief that the individual soul can attain mystical unity with God. This point of view is essentially the one that underlies all of Huxley's later books, and it receives its explicit expression in his anthology of mystical writings, *The Perennial Philosophy* (1945).

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Gerald Heard was the principal reason for

Huxley's conversion. He may have speeded up the process, but, as Huxley pointed out in a letter to me, the interest in mysticism extended back for two decades before Heard entered the picture. "I have known Gerald Heard for about fifteen years," he wrote, "but my preoccupation with the subject of mysticism—an interest partly positive, partly negative; a fascination that was also hostile—dates back much further. The title of my first volume of undergraduate verse, 'The Burning Wheel', is derived from Boehme, whom I read while still at Oxford. In a later novel, 'Point Counter Point', there are episodes in which something in the nature of a mystical experience is interpreted in terms of Leuba's explaining-away hypotheses. The negative interest became positive in the early Thirties, not as the result of any single event so much as because all the rest—art, science, literature, the pleasures of thought and sensation—came to seem (as patriotism came to seem to Nurse Cavell) 'not enough.' One reaches a point where one says, even of Beethoven, even of Shakespeare, 'Is this all?'"

The change produced by Huxley's conversion to mysticism was so startling that critics did not know what to make of *Eyeless in Gaza* when it appeared in 1936. Huxley now writes as a twice-born man and a propagandist.

Anthony Beavis, the hero of the novel, is a sociologist. He is a highly intelligent, self-centered man, who for a long time succeeds in neatly dividing his life into two compartments: the intellectual and the sexual. Gradually his affair with his mistress turns sour, and he begins to realize that he has never faced any question of final significance. His salvation comes from a mystic named Dr. Miller, whose influence leads him, step by step, into mysticism. The book pictures the spectacle of Beavis's nature being gradually transformed by his new knowledge and experience, until at last he achieves the serenity that comes of the mystical union with God.

In the concluding chapter Beavis is preparing to give a talk on pacifism at a public

meeting. He has received an anonymous note, threatening him with a bloody nose if he dares make the speech. He wonders whether he will have the courage to submit to physical violence without hitting back. Gradually, as he sits in his room, he achieves the mystical state. The passage in which this is described bears a strong resemblance to the one about Marjorie Carling in *Point Counter Point*, but there is now no suggestion of self-deception. "Peace through liberation, for peace is achieved freedom. Freedom and at the same time truth. The truth of unity actually experienced. Peace in the depths, under the storm, far down below the leaping of the waves, the frantically flying spray. Peace in this profound subaqueous night, peace in this silence, where there are no more images, no more words."

The entire passage extends over four and a half pages and is the climax of the book. At its conclusion, the hero leaves for the meeting, tranquilly certain that he can face anything without loss of moral courage.

Huxley has since written two other novels, and in both of them the mystical element is dominant. Indeed, from one viewpoint they are scarcely more than glorified tracts, designed to win as many people as possible over to mysticism.

The theme of *After Many a Summer Dies the Swan* (1939) is stated by Mr. Propter, the mystic who serves as Huxley's spokesman:

Good manifests itself only on the animal level and on the level of eternity. Knowing that, you'll realize that the best you can do on the human level is preventive. You can see that purely human activities don't interfere too much with the manifestation of good on the other levels. That's all. . . . The realists who have studied the nature of the world know that an exclusively humanistic attitude towards life is always fatal, and that all strictly human activities must therefore be made instrumental to animal and spiritual good. They know, in other words, that men's business is to make the human world safe for animals and spirits.

The folly of living on the human level is illustrated by Mr. Stoyte, the fabulously wealthy oil magnate who lives in a huge castle

of reinforced concrete in California. Haunted by fears of death, he has engaged a brilliant young doctor to discover for him the secret of indefinitely prolonged life. The quest leads to the basement of an English country home where a nobleman of the eighteenth century is discovered in vigorous health despite his 201 years. He has lived to this astonishing age by virtue of a diet consisting largely of the entrails of a certain kind of long-lived fish. The only disadvantage is that he has meanwhile turned into an ape—a fitting symbol of the fate of life lived on the purely human level. (Man, the doctor explains, is a case of arrested development; if he lives long enough he attains his biological destiny.) Mr. Stoyte, however, prefers the prospect of becoming an ape to the horrors of death. The book ends with a strong suggestion that he will soon begin a diet of fish entrails.

After the Gothic grotesqueness of *After Many a Summer*, the next novel, *Time Must Have a Stop*, comes as an excursion into sweetness and light. Huxley's keen observation of human foibles is as prominent as ever, but it is undoubtedly the most compassionate novel he has written; he pities rather than despises the characters who typify everything he regards as false and futile. One cannot escape the feeling that Huxley's conversion is beginning to transform him, as the hero of *Eyeless in Gaza* was transformed.

There is the inevitable mystic, Bruno, who serves as the voice of sanity. He is more individualized than his counterparts in the two preceding novels. The hero is an adolescent writer, almost an infant prodigy, named Sebastian Barnack, whose life is radically reshaped by the influence of Bruno. The vanity of hedonism is illustrated in the person of Uncle Eustace, a fat, jolly, and kind-hearted Epicurean. One of the most memorable passages in the book describes the adventures of his soul after death, and how it prefers to cherish cheap memories of women and cigars rather than be engulfed in the divine Reality.

Uncle Eustace demonstrates the futility of

the life of the senses; the hero's father, John Barnack, reveals the equal futility of do-good reformism. He is an agnostic pharisee, proud of having devoted his life to what he conceives to be the service of his fellows, but real love for his fellows is completely lacking in him. In place of it, there is only a cold sense of duty. By the time the book ends he has become a spiritual dwarf, shrunk up by his own doctrinaire simplification of life, and sinking more and more into hopeless pessimism as he sees the world move farther and farther from utopia.

In addition to his last three novels, Huxley has written four non-fiction books which round out the picture of his present philosophy. *Ends and Means* is an ambitious and systematic treatment of mystical philosophy, and the ways it can be applied to the salvation of modern civilization. *Grey Eminence* is a case study of what happens when a mystic turns politician; it is a biography of Father Joseph, who became Richelieu's right-hand man and intrigued for the greater glory of God and France, thereby helped prolong the Thirty Years' War, and indirectly planted the seeds of World Wars I and II. *The Perennial Philosophy*, an anthology of mystical writings of the last twenty-five centuries, provides the most elaborate statement of Huxley's mysticism; his running commentary also deals with many of the social implications of his metaphysics. Finally, his most recent book, *Science, Liberty and Peace*, is a brief study of the purposes and limitations of science, and the part that scientists can play in preventing world catastrophe; like the others, it presupposes the truth of mysticism.

V

The popular impression of the mystic is that of a man who spends his days gazing at his navel and lets the world go hang. Huxley himself, in his earlier period, shared the general attitude; as we have seen, he described "spirituality" as "the primal curse of India and the cause of all her misfortunes."

Now that Huxley has embraced the religion he once criticized so savagely, it is only fair to

look at the record and see whether he is interested only in uniting the soul of Aldous Huxley with the ultimate reality called God.

Contrary to expectation, he is not. He is, if anything, more concerned about the state of the world and more eager to do something to improve it than he was when he regarded it as little more than a predatory and occasionally amusing jungle.

The books, both fiction and non-fiction, that Huxley has published in the last ten years provide materials for a number of generalizations. The first is that a law of causality operates in all spheres of life. It is impossible to separate Ends and Means. If bad means are employed for good ends, the ends will be subtly changed by the means and will turn bad. The French Revolution ended in the dictatorship of Napoleon; the Russian Revolution developed a new police-state in which millions of peasants perished because they stood in the way of the economic plans of the new ruling class.

Huxley is opposed to violent revolutions because of his theory of Ends and Means; he also contends that it has become hopeless for the masses, armed at best with small arms and hand grenades, to defy the state with its tanks, planes, and flame-throwers. Writing in his latest book, *Science, Liberty and Peace*, he says:

Is there any way out of the unfavorable political situation in which, thanks to applied science, the masses now find themselves? So far only one hopeful issue has been discovered. In South Africa and, later, in India, Gandhi and his followers were confronted by an oppressive government armed with overwhelming military might. Gandhi, who is not only an idealist and a man of principle, but also an intensely practical politician, attempted to cope with this seemingly desperate situation by organizing a nonviolent form of direct action, which he called *satyagraha*. . . . Here it is only necessary to state that the method achieved a number of striking successes against odds which, from a military point of view, were overwhelmingly great. . . .

As a corollary to his opposition to violence, Huxley is naturally an uncompromising pacifist. His biography of Father Joseph, *Grey Eminence*, paints a ghastly picture of the material and spiritual devastation of war, and

shows a line of causation extending from the Thirty Years' War to World Wars I and II.

As long as most men and women are content to live on the "merely human" level, Huxley sees little possibility of improving society by large-scale political movements. The mystics are obliged to operate on the edges of society, but they can do an untold amount of good there, as witness the case of the Quakers and their humanitarian activities. Most of all, the mystics can serve society by being what they are. "The mystics," writes Huxley, "are the channels through which a little knowledge of reality filters down into our human universe of ignorance and illusion. A totally unmystical world would be a world totally blind and insane."

Huxley's views on economics set him apart from both the *laissez-faire* capitalists and the Communists. The one thing that Henry Ford and Stalin have in common is their belief in "bigger and better." Huxley's alternative is decentralization and individual responsibility. He envisions a society in which applied science, instead of being used only to increase the power of big business and big government, is turned to the use of small producers. One of the clearest statements of his position is given in *Science, Liberty and Peace*:

The centralizing of industrial capacity in big mass-producing factories has resulted in the centralization of a large part of the population in cities and in the reduction of ever-increasing numbers of individuals to complete dependence upon a few private capitalists and their managers, or upon the one public capitalist, the state, represented by politicians and working through civil servants. So far as liberty is concerned, there is little to choose between the two types of boss. . . .

But now let us suppose that those who make it their business to apply the results of pure science to economic ends should elect to do so, not primarily for the benefit of big business, big cities and big government, but with the conscious aim of providing individuals with the means of doing profitable and intrinsically significant work, of helping men and women to achieve independence from bosses, so that they may become their own employers, or members of a self-governing, co-operative group working for subsistence and a local market. . . . Seconded by appropriate legislation, this differently orientated technological

progress would result, not as at present in the further concentration of power and the completer subordination of the many to the few, but in a progressive decentralization of population, of accessibility of land, of ownership of the means of production, of political and economic power. . . .

In *After Many a Summer* the mystic, Mr. Propter, is busy establishing a small and almost self-sustaining community of Okies; the power for it, he hopes, will be provided by an inexpensive machine for converting the energy of the sun into electricity.

The general lines of Huxley's ideal society are clear enough. It would be a world in which most men either ran their own farms or businesses, or belonged to democratic coöperative associations. Economic and political power would be decentralized. Each individual would have much greater responsibility than is true of industrial workers today. Freed from the incessant distractions of super-organized life he would at least have the opportunity, if he chose, to make whatever progress he could toward the ultimate end of life: unitive knowledge of God.

There is an inner consistency to Huxley's social and economic theories. They are based on what he calls the "higher utilitarianism." The final aim of life, from the mystic's point of view, is to achieve unity with God. The best society is the one which interposes the fewest obstacles to this goal. Modern civilization, with its wars, assembly lines, and blaring radios, creates so many distractions that only the occasional saint is able to resist the outer pressure and make the effort to go as far as he can in his religious quest. The justification for a small-scale economy and decentralization is that men would have more individual responsibility and freedom of action, and therefore more control over their own souls. Such an economy (as Huxley recognizes) is very unlikely to come into being as long as nationalism is the world-wide religion, and the assembly-line is essential to preparations for future wars; hence Huxley finds an additional reason for his all-out pacifism.

The significance of Huxley is not so much

that he has turned to mysticism in particular as that he has come to grips with the basic problem that the thinkers of the next few decades must face. The problem is very simple: Do life and the universe have any ultimate meaning? The question has been largely waved aside in the distractions of the last hundred years. The discoveries of science and the advances of technology have been so exciting that few intellectuals have stopped to ask themselves, *So what?*

In the last analysis, there are two answers to the question. It is either Yes or No. If the answer is No, there are several alternative courses of action. One can say, as the characters in Huxley's early novels did, that the universe is a haphazard machine and life is essentially without meaning, but meanwhile it is pleasant to eat good food, sleep with attractive women, and make brilliant remarks. But even the early Huxley knew intuitively that such a solution is not permanent. The emptiness will be filled with something.

The second alternative for the man who sees no final meaning in anything is to worship idols. He can, by an effort of the will, create meaning in a circumscribed area of life and forget about the leering emptiness outside the charmed circle. He can worship the state, the chosen race. This again is no final solution, for the state or race can have meaning only if

it is a part of a universe which has meaning as a whole.

The answer of Yes requires an act of faith. It demands the unverifiable belief that the universe and life do have an over-all significance, and that each individual can somehow fit into that significance. Theoretically, such a belief might take many forms. It might lead the believer to Judaism, to Mohammedanism, or to a general theism. As a matter of fact, it seems to be leading mainly in two directions: Christianity and mysticism. Auden and Eliot turn (or return) to Christianity; Huxley, Isherwood, and Heard embrace mysticism. But mystics and Christians have one all-important bond in common: they believe that the universe makes sense, or, as Huxley puts it, they have faith in the "moral and spiritual reliability of the universe."

The question that Huxley faced underlies every other philosophic and social question. It is back of every theory of society, every program for social and economic change. Huxley seems an isolated figure today because he is supermodern, and has confronted the question that the intellectual and the man in the street must both face in the next few decades. One can only hope that those who will meet the challenge in the future will confront it with honesty and courage equal to Huxley's, and will resolve to apply their answer to the restoration of civilization and human decency.

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Revelation and Reason

S. PAUL SCHILLING*

ANY adequate investigation of the relations of faith and reason must deal with the more limited but quite basic question of the bearing on each other of revelation and reason. Indeed, Emil Brunner goes so far as to maintain that "the problem of Christian philosophy is the problem of the interpenetration of the two spheres, of the secular and knowable, and the supernatural and revealed. . . . Here we need to do some more fundamental thinking."¹ Whether or not the present paper evidences fundamental thinking on this problem, it represents at least an effort to think truly about fundamentals.

By revelation is meant the total activity by which God discloses his character, purpose, and will to men in order to lead them into fellowship with himself. Reason is viewed as the thinking activity of man which seeks to discover truth by criticizing, relating, ordering, and interpreting coherently the data of consciousness. Our problem is to determine as accurately as possible what relation obtains between the two.

I. PRESUPPOSITIONS

For the sake of clarity, it will be well to state at the outset certain presuppositions which underlie the position taken.

1. *The personality of God.* Basic to the entire discussion is the conviction that the ultimately real is best characterized as personal. By this is meant that God, on whom all else depends, is a center of intelligent aware-

ness, who thinks, purposes, wills, feels, and values. Unbound by the physical, mental, and moral limitations of human beings, God alone is complete personality. He may be described as the eternally creative, supremely personal, infinitely wise and holy Spirit, the Creator and Sustainer of all existence and the Conserver of all value, who in sacrificial love is ceaselessly working to bring humanity into fellowship with himself, and so to realize a community of righteousness and love. He is not only a Being who *is*, but a God who *acts*, who takes the initiative in revealing his will to men, and who works in history to achieve his purposes.

2. *Man's capacity to respond to God.* There is a fundamental kinship between God and man. The "image of God" has been blurred, but not destroyed, by human sin. Man has been endowed by his Creator with sufficient intelligence, ethical insight, and spiritual sensitivity to enable him to recognize the presence and activity of God, and with the capacity to respond to the divine disclosure. Apart from such capacities, revelation would be meaningless, for nothing would be revealed to anybody. As Sergius Bulgakoff expresses it, revelation

presupposes a certain reciprocity, or a likeness between the image of God and man, in fact, their correlatedness. It is necessary for God to be in a certain sense human and for man to have something divine within him, if man is to become a recipient of revelation, and if intercourse between God and man is to become possible.²

Though the initiative is obviously with God, man's role in the revelatory process is not passive but active. Particular men may, of course, fail to respond favorably, because of limited intelligence, pride, egotism, or other factors, but where revelation is real, man must respond. The response God seeks is that of faith, commitment, and obedience, and where

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these are present revelation reaches its highest levels.

3. *The validity of both general and special revelation.* The widely recognized distinction between two forms of revelation, general and special, is sound. The former refers to those activities in which all men may discern the divine presence; notably, the phenomena of nature and history and man's experiences of truth, beauty, goodness, and holiness. The latter asserts that God is manifested most adequately in particular events in the lives of particular individuals at particular times; for the Christian, in the events centering in the coming of Christ. The real God is truly revealed in both types. They are in no sense contradictory, but rather complementary. General revelation, in addition to having intrinsic value, prepares man for and finds its fulfillment in special manifestations of the divine, through which alone man enters the most meaningful personal relationship with God.

4. *The Bible as the record of special revelation.* For Christian believers the Bible inevitably holds a highly significant place in all thought concerning revelation. It is important, however, to regard it as the record of or the witness to the revelation rather than the revelation itself, which is the living reality of the self-communicating activity of God. "Divine revelation," writes Brunner, "is not a book or a doctrine; the revelation is God Himself in His self-manifestation within history. Revelation is something that *happens*, the living history of God in His dealings with the human race." The Scriptures, on the other hand, are "the incarnation in written form of the living personal revelation of the living God."³

5. *The functional significance of revelation.* Closely related to the foregoing is the recognition that revelation is not the impartation of a body of correct theological doctrine, but a series of acts by which God seeks to guide life toward divine ends. It is not dogma or infallible truths that are revealed, but the power and purpose of God. Here is one area in which liberal and neo-orthodox thinkers are in virtual

agreement. "Revelation," says Professor Brightman, "is a series of purposive divine acts which so stimulate human experience as to lead man nearer God."⁴ Brunner, finding God supremely revealed in a "personal encounter" with man, vigorously attacks the fundamental error which equates the revelation with revealed doctrine.⁵ A. G. Hogg declares in his essay in the Madras Series: "Whether to Christian faith or to non-Christian, God reveals Himself; He does not reveal ready-made truths about Himself."⁶ Truly seen, revelation is dynamic and teleological, seeking to lift man out of sin into that personal relation to God which constitutes his salvation.

II. HISTORICAL POSITIONS

Against the background of these five pre-suppositions, we turn now to the central problem of the relation between revelation and reason. The long history of discussion on this issue indicates that two opposite dangers need carefully to be guarded against: the exaltation of revelation at the expense of reason; and the glorification of reason to the detriment of revelation. Edgar P. Dickie properly insists that both the disinheritance and the apotheosis of reason must be avoided, and essentially the same may be said with equal truth regarding revelation.

The main positions taken in the history of Christian thought have been given definitive classification and formulation by Etienne Gilson in his finely written treatise, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*. He distinguishes four major views:

1. *Tertullianism.* Tertullian and his followers regard the relation as one of sharp antagonism. "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? . . . We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief."⁷ Revelation alone yields truth; it needs no help from reason, which merely expresses human opinions and is therefore without value for faith.

2. *Augustinianism*. For this tradition faith is prior but not opposed to reason. Faith in revelation provides the foundation on which reason may build. Revelation furnishes the data with which reason works. Hence understanding follows faith. As Gilson puts it, for the Augustinian "the safest way to reach truth is not the one that starts from reason and then goes on from rational certitude to faith, but, on the contrary, the way whose starting point is faith and then goes on from revelation to reason."⁸

3. *Averroism*. Though marked by considerable diversity among themselves, in general the Averroists regard revelation as a popular republication of the truths of reason, which in their pure form are attainable only by philosophy. Revelation adds no knowledge of its own, so is logically unnecessary, but it renders a valuable service for those who are intellectually incapable of grasping the necessary truths of philosophy. For some of these lesser minds, the theologians, philosophical truth is expressed in terms of dialectical probability; for ordinary folk, on the still lower level of imagination, it is accepted by faith.

4. *Thomism*. There remains the view of Thomas Aquinas, who sought to reconcile reason and revelation by assigning a role to each. For Thomism there are two classes of revealed truth: (a) truths which, though revealed, are accessible to unaided reason; and (b) the articles of faith which lie beyond the reach of reason. The former is a valuable preparation for the latter. However, they are two distinct species of knowledge; one being based on objective considerations which compel intellectual assent, while the other represents an act of faith where the rational evidence is incomplete. Yet the two comprise an organic unity, since both spring from the same divine source.

All four of these positions are represented in modern theology. Nevertheless, as H. Richard Niebuhr has pointed out, changing thought-forms and new approaches to philosophical and biblical interpretation have led to re-definition of the issues and new efforts toward solution.⁹

As will appear later, the present writer completely rejects the extremes of Tertullianism and Averroism. His position contains both Augustinian and Thomistic elements, but is not to be identified completely with either or with both together. Augustine makes insufficient allowance for the distinctive contribution of reason, and offers no cogent principle for harmonizing its claims with those of revelation. Thomism is a brilliant attempt at reconciliation, but its synthesis presupposes an intellectualistic rather than a dynamic conception of revelation, and hence is unsatisfactory.

III. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF REVELATION AND REASON

Careful investigation of the nature of religious experience affords ample evidence that both revelation and reason must be recognized as valid if the data are to be adequately explained. Each plays a distinctive role, yet depends significantly on the other. Their relation is one of interpenetration and interdependence.

1. *The Function of Revelation*

a. *One basic consideration indicating the need of revelation may be quite briefly mentioned. It concerns the difference between our knowledge of other persons, including the divine Person, and things.* Though all genuine knowledge, even of the physical world, may be said to depend ultimately on an activity in things to which our minds respond, our knowledge of material objects is much more readily obtained through our own mental effort than is our understanding of other persons. I know my friend not merely because I observe his conduct and try to understand him, but also, and more importantly, because he chooses to reveal something of himself to me. His words and gestures specifically directed to this end are the ground of my deepest knowledge of him. Without this revelatory activity on his part, that knowledge would be very superficial indeed. Genuine knowledge on the personal plane thus requires much more than rational effort on the

part of the knower. If God is to be known, therefore, it must be basically because he reveals himself.

b. *Apart from revelation, reason cannot satisfactorily account for the content of religious experience.* Reason does not constitute, produce, or create reality in religion or elsewhere; it rather guides, relates, interprets, and evaluates what is given in consciousness. Much of the given in religious experience is most coherently to be explained as traceable to the revelatory activity of God. This is not to assert that God has disclosed to man the content of Christian doctrine, but rather that he has led men to the experiences of which these doctrinal formulations are the rational interpretation. These experiences become understandable only if a power other than man's reason is presupposed.

Belief in revelation is thus supported by faith in reason no less than by a recognition of its limitations. Brightman shows, for example, that general revelation must be affirmed if one is to think reasonably at all:

The postulate that experience is revelatory of the real is essential to rational thinking; the alternative to it is solipsism which is the abandonment of rational interpretation of experience. Sense experience, taken religiously, is a revelation of the power and rationality of God; value experience adds a revelation of his loyalty to goodness, beauty, truth, and holiness as the principles of his being and of all personal development. It is just as unreasonable to suppose that man's will has created value experience out of nothing as to assume that it has thus created sense experience.¹⁰

c. *A further important contribution rendered by revelation is its enrichment of religion through its concretely historical content.* Apart from the self-disclosure of God in history which revelation involves, religion would be immeasurably impoverished, becoming something quite other and less than it has actually been. Partly because of its revelatory nature, the Christian faith is naturalized in history, with the result that it is not merely a theological construction, but a living experience of God. Its object of worship is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of Peter, James, and John; a God who not only is, but speaks

and acts on the stage of history to achieve his ends.

The significance of this element in Christianity is graphically portrayed in Augustine's account of his search for God through Neoplatonist writings. In them, he reports, he found elaborated in great detail the notion of a divine eternal Logos, much as in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel; but he missed any suggestion of an entrance of the Logos into human life, his participation in human suffering, or his redeeming work—in short, the incarnation. He read there, writes Augustine, that the Word was the eternal agent of creation and the principle of light. "But, that 'He came unto His own,'" and "that 'the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us,' I read not there."¹¹ The difference lies basically in the fact that Neoplatonism was largely a philosophical system, whereas Christianity is a religion of revelation, which through the incarnation of God in human history discloses the meaning and reality behind history.

d. *Special revelation serves much the same function in the sphere of religion as that fulfilled by the intuitions of musical and poetic genius.* In each case true insights into life's meaning are gained through non-rational—though not anti-rational—experiences. A. E. Taylor develops this analogy impressively. After interpreting genius as the capacity to notice and respond sensitively to aspects of reality which elude the average man, he continues:

If, then, the very world of nature and everyday human life would largely be closed to us, but for our readiness to trust disclosures which come, in the first instance, to the exceptional few, it is unreasonable to deny the probability that the same thing may hold true of God, the transcendent reality. We should rather expect that the analogy would hold here also; that there would be exceptional persons to whom this reality, too, is immediately disclosed in a special manner, and that here, as elsewhere, the best of what is to be discerned will be lost on us, if we refuse to learn to see through our eyes.¹²

So-called "religious genius" is not self-explanatory, but is most truly interpreted as resulting from the actual self-disclosure of God:

To speak of "religious genius" is not to *explain* a fact, but merely to give the fact a new label. To explain revelation by calling it genius is merely to explain one mystery by another. And if we have been right in maintaining that genius, in its various forms, is special *receptiveness*, and its so-called "intuitions," as the very name implies, apprehensions of a reality actually there and given, we have not done even so much as to replace one mystery by another by introducing "genius" into the argument. We have only admitted the fact that there are special apprehensions of a self-disclosing God, which are not bestowed equally on all of us. We have admitted not the possibility, but the actuality of revelation.¹³

Amid the richness and variety of life, one of the extrarational media of genuine insight is found in revelatory experience. For the deeply religious man this medium may be paramount.

2. The Contribution of Reason

In a time when much religious thought is under the dominance of humanistic and naturalistic influences, it is highly desirable to re-state the case for revelation. This we have attempted to do. However, at least equally powerful today, if not more so, is the sway of irrationalistic neosupernaturalism, with its denial of validity to man's reasoning capacities in the knowledge of God. It is therefore necessary to examine also the claims of reason.

Through the Christian revelation, writes Brunner, "we perceive . . . rational knowledge to be a ray of the eternal Wisdom of God; but this rational knowledge itself does not give us any access to that Wisdom of God; it is merely a pointer to it, as it is a reflection from it."¹⁴ Karl Barth is much more extreme, maintaining that affirmations concerning God belong to an order "absolutely beyond human thought." God is "the Holy One, whom to see, even to see indirectly, would require other eyes than ours which are corrupted by sin, . . . the God to whom there is no way and no bridge, of whom we could not say or have to say one single word, had He not of His own initiative met us as *Deus revelatus*."¹⁵

This mistrust of reason is echoed by Richard Kroner, for whom God is "beyond empirical

comprehension, . . . beyond human capacity altogether." "We cannot comprehend or conceive God, we can only obey and trust him, adore and worship him, fear and love him. The right attitude toward God therefore is not theory or doctrine, but devotion and prayer. Not mystical experience or speculation, but his self-revelation alone can make us know him."¹⁶

According to this view, therefore, reason has no relevance or authority where revelation is concerned. The latter is its own criterion, and can be truly viewed only from its own standpoint. To speak of revelation means "that there is nothing other, nothing higher above this act from which it might be based or derived, that it is the condition which conditions everything without itself being conditioned." As a "historical" event, revelation is "a fact with no court of reference above it by which it could be inspected. . . . Revelation simply is the *ineffabile* confronting man, getting at man, and as such it proves itself."¹⁷ Kraemer insists that the rational defense of the Christian faith is inherently impossible, since it involves making human reason the standard of reference, whereas only God and his Word are the ultimate authority.¹⁸ While Brunner assigns a larger place to reason than the Barthians, at this point he is in essential agreement with them. In faith, he writes, revelation includes reason, but reason never includes revelation. "The conception of the God of revelation is and remains suprarational, because God is the *Lord*, who can be known only through revelation."¹⁹

The vigorous expression of the point of view just presented has no doubt served as a needed corrective to the extravagant claims for the rationality of man which have characterized some religious thought during the first decades of the present century. However, at best it is as partial and untrue as the rationalism it seeks to displace, while at worst it opens the way to a dangerous dogmatism and obscurantism and becomes a gross distortion of the Christian faith. It is open to serious criticism at at least four points, which

also serve as foci for a positive statement of the contributions of reason to revelation.

a. *Reason is needed as a preparation for revelation and as a principle of interpretation after it comes.* There is value in the Thomistic view that, more or less independently, reason may arrive at understandings which closely parallel appreciation for the specific affirmations of the Christian faith. Further, man's thinking capacity plays an important role in fitting him for an acceptance of revelation. Augustine writes that "we could not even believe if we had not rational minds,"²⁰ and even Brunner admits that reason is needed "to perceive, to receive, what God speaks."²¹

Revelation is effective only to the degree that man, the recipient, responds. A meaningful response requires understanding and elucidation of the event, which are impossible without reflection. Divine revelation involves the loftiest experience open to man; its fullest realization requires the unhampered use, not the repression, of his highest faculties, including his capacity to think. Unless he would lose the best, he must use his best.

b. *If revelation claims truth, it cannot dispense with reason.* Religion asserts that in the revelatory experience a true knowledge of God is attained, that a true awareness of the ultimately real is achieved, that religious truth is apprehended. This claim inevitably brings revelation into the same universe of discourse as reason, which is an impartial search for truth. In so far, therefore, as revelation discloses the true, it is in accord with rather than opposed to coherent thought, which seeks the same goal. Hence he who disparages reason for the sake of revelation not only "puts out the light of both," as Locke said,²² but raises serious questions regarding the validity of the truth which he insists has been revealed. Genuine revelation is helped rather than hindered, clarified rather than obscured, by rational inquiry. The true cannot be self-contradictory.

c. *Reason alone offers a sufficiently comprehensive standard for testing rival revelation-*

claims. Apart from it, there is no way of transcending the arbitrary declaration of each competitor that it offers the final truth. Unless we are prepared to grant that the claimed revelations of Mary Baker Eddy, Joseph Smith, Father Divine, orthodox Protestantism, and Roman Catholicism are all equally valid, which is nonsensical, we must use our rational faculties to the limit in the effort to determine degrees of truth. Only where this is recognized can there be any conceivable meeting-ground for differing religious movements. As Edgar P. Dickie has expressed it, "Deny the authenticity of reason's judgment and you make it for ever impossible for man to tell when he has the truth; when God is speaking to him. Irrationalism is in danger of ending in agnosticism."²³

What, then, is the standard? William Temple offers the double criterion of practical effectiveness and philosophical completeness, maintaining that a revelation must justify its claim to the personal surrender of its devotees by "its capacity to render experience as a whole even more intelligible and by its power, when accepted, to guide men through the perplexities of life."²⁴

Certainly the practical principle suggested must play a genuine and important part in any rational criterion. A faith which transforms and enriches life must be presumed to contain large elements of truth. A. E. Taylor is right when he says that a religion is true "just in so far as it achieves the purpose . . . of thoroughly remoulding the self, so as to make God, the supernatural good, and eternity the very center of a man's thought and will."²⁵ Similarly, Walter M. Horton finds the Christian revelation "verified" whenever a Christian finds "peace with God through Christ."²⁶

It is nevertheless true that noble living and peace of mind may be produced by mutually contradictory faiths, making it clear that a more comprehensive criterion is necessary. This is to be found in the other principle suggested by Temple, that of systematic

coherence. This seems to be the test envisaged by Whitehead when he writes: "Rational religion appeals to the direct intuition of special occasions and to the elucidatory power of its concepts for all occasions." Quoting this passage and referring to Jesus Christ as the special occasion appealed to by Christianity, Richard Niebuhr continues: "From that special occasion we also derive the concepts which make possible the elucidation of all the events in our history. Revelation is this intelligible event which makes all other events intelligible."²⁷ The same principle is affirmed by Walter M. Horton. Though elsewhere he agrees with Brunner and the Barthians that reason cannot be used as a measuring rod to test the truth of the gospel, which is its own standard, he nevertheless contends that the revelation of God in Christ is "confirmed by its power to unify and crown all other truth."²⁸ He thus seems to apply the coherence criterion in spite of himself. This principle is basic. That claimed revelation may be regarded as most fully true which offers the most harmonious interpretation of experience as a whole.

It is not maintained that complete coherence ever has been or can be attained by any human mind. The person applying the test inevitably views life from a particular perspective, produced by a complex of individual and group factors. Try though he may, he can probably never attain a wholly objective judgment. This accounts in considerable measure for the wide variety of interpretations of essentially the same set of facts. Yet this is no reason for renouncing the criterion or being content with anything less than the fullest possible application of it. The remedy for imperfect coherence is not incoherence, but more and better coherence. There must be a determined endeavor to view the data from the broadest possible perspective and interpret them with the fullest attainable approximation of the goal of complete internal consistency and harmonious connectedness with the whole of experience. In religion the standard is particularly difficult to apply

because of the deep personal feeling normally involved in religious convictions. This only makes it all the more relevant and the need of a strenuous effort to apply it all the more urgent. The alternative is a hopeless relativism which would make religious faith a purely private matter with no valid truth-content at all. On this basis, revelation would reveal nothing but the individual wishes or interests of the believer.

It is not enough, therefore, to dismiss rational inquiry by saying simply, "This is true because it is the Word of God, and beyond that you cannot go." It is always legitimate to ask, "Why do you think it is the Word of God? What are the grounds of your judgment? To raise this query is not to doubt the Word of God, but merely to examine the validity of a human judgment about that Word. Sweeping authoritarian declarations about the necessity of adopting God's point of view rather than man's assume a capacity which man simply does not possess, since he is not God. From this point of view, it is the neo-orthodox theologian more than his critic who is guilty of making extravagant claims for man!

As a matter of fact, do most thoughtful Christian believers accept the Christian revelation merely because it *claims* to be true, or because the Bible affirms it? Do they not rather make it their own basically because it "rings true," because it fits their best insight and experience, because it harmonizes with the rest of the facts as far as they have related them? Even Kraemer, taking his stand within the Christian revelation, and insisting on its discontinuity with all other religions, can hardly be wholly arbitrary. Does he not take this position because deep within his being he finds it the most valid, the most meaningful, yes, the most rational? In short, are there not implicit if not explicit reasons for his choice? If some such general evaluation is implicit, is there not excellent ground for trying to explicate it and possibly to improve it through systematic examination and criticism? The choice is between an intelli-

gent faith and the unexamined life which Socrates said is not worth living.

It is significant that Richard Kroner, in spite of his emphasis, already referred to, on an unconditioned revelation, admits this. "As Protestants," he writes,

we believe in the Creator because He has revealed Himself in the biblical story of His creation; but we could not believe in Him if we did not believe that He has revealed Himself as infinitely good, and, therefore, the true God. . . . The Bible is the Bible not because the church or any other authority decrees that it is a holy book and to be revered, but because we, as moral beings, are convinced that the spirit which reveals itself in this book is really holy and divine. The biblical God answers our moral ideas, otherwise we would be compelled to abandon our faith.²⁹

d. One additional factor may be mentioned quite briefly. Reason must be integrally related to revelation if the unity and integrity of personality are to be maintained. It is the whole self that receives whatever revelation is vouchsafed to man; it is the whole self that worships God; and it is the whole self that thinks about God, the world, and human destiny. A view which arbitrarily sets up a partition and says essentially, "This is the sphere of revelation, and that of reason," is false to the nature of the personal life. Man's thinking capacity, whether small or large, operates in some measure in every other area of his life. The burden of proof is on him who would assert that in religion alone we have an exception to this rule, and the evidence is not forthcoming. In the absence of such evidence, reason must be assigned an integral role in the revelatory process.

IV. SUMMARY

Viewing revelation as the self-manifesting activity of God in human experience and reason as man's interpretation of this self-disclosure in relation to the totality of his experience, we have found the relationship to be one not of conflict but of interpenetration and interdependence. Millar Burrows' suggestion regarding revelation and discovery in biblical theology is equally relevant here. "The apparent antithesis," he writes,

is practically resolved by the biblical conception of all knowledge as ultimately dependent on revelation. From this point of view, discovery is only the recognition of something that has been revealed. . . . So any discovery is dependent, first, upon the existence of what is discovered, a reality capable of being apprehended by the human mind, and, secondly, upon the endowment of man with the capacity to discover and recognize it.³⁰

God, we affirm, acts in various ways, general and specific, to disclose his will and purpose to men, resulting in definite religious insights which would not and often could not be discoverable by reason alone. This revelatory activity of God is fundamental. However, much that claims to be revelation is falsely so regarded. Reason is therefore needed to distinguish between genuine revelation and revelation-claims which contradict other aspects of our experience, as well as to interpret the meaning for life of what is actually disclosed. When their functions are so conceived, revelation and reason are not opponents or competitors, but partners in the total relation of man to God.

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Faith and Reason

In Relation to the Doctrine of the Trinity

CLAUDE WELCH*

THE Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been selected as the point of reference for this discussion because it brings into a single focus two crucial questions in the general problem of faith and reason. First, there are the questions concerning the basis of the doctrine in revelation—questions of the nature of revelation, the relation of revelation and reason, and the nature of faith. Second, the culmination of the doctrinal development in the acceptance of trinitarian formulae raises the problem of the meaning and nature of our language about God. Specifically, what sort and degree of validity can we attach to these formulae as descriptions of the inner nature of God? The development and formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity not only illustrates these general problems but offers elements of a solution within the framework of Christian thought.

I

We may ask first, then, what sort of revelation is actually presupposed by the doctrine of the Trinity? The witness of the New Testament is of primary importance, and we certainly do not find there any systematic declaration of trinitarian theology.¹ Even Father Lebreton admits that the theology of the Holy Spirit is veiled with a certain obscurity in the New Testament.² But if we could understand the actual relation of Christian dogma to revelation, we cannot stop with the exegesis of biblical texts and the cataloging of New Testament concepts. It does not matter whether

the apostles held a belief in the triunity of God, if it be recognized that that doctrine is required for a full understanding of the experience of Christianity as a religious community. This principle is precisely that affirmed in the trinitarian controversies of the third and fourth centuries. Athanasius persistently contended that the term *ὁμοούσιος* simply makes explicit the sense of Scripture concerning the divinity of Christ.³ This explication is necessary because the terminology of Scripture permits equivocation and misinterpretation. The New Testament does not explicitly contain the dogma of the Trinity any more than it explicitly contains any other dogma—if only for the reason that it stands in a definite historical situation and not in contrast with the errors of a later day, the errors which were the occasion of the formulation of dogma. Dogma is to be understood as the culmination of a process of interpretation and rationalization which has its beginning in the earliest witness to the faith.

What we may properly seek in the New Testament is the nature of the Christian experience which could lead to Nicaea and Constantinople, i.e., the root of the doctrine. Unless we suppose that the Church was from the first utterly unfaithful to her message, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the questions which were answered by the doctrine of the Trinity were fundamental to the faith of the Church.

The "confession of Father, Son and Spirit," says Harnack, "is the unfolding of the belief that Jesus is the Christ."⁴ This is the root of the doctrine of the Trinity: the assertion that Jesus Christ is the Lord. But this is a somewhat derivative affirmation. The understanding of the Person of Christ is inseparable from the appreciation and appropriation of his work. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself."⁵ Among the titles de-

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scriptive of Jesus—*υἱός, χριστός, κύριος, θεός*—the prominence of *χριστός* is indicative of the primary New Testament interest in doing justice to the Christian experience of redemption. According to one New Testament expression of this interest, the Lordship of Christ appears quite subordinate as compared with him who is properly called *θεός* and *κύριος*. There is but One who is good; it is his kingdom which Jesus announces. Jesus' life finds its meaning in obedience to God; his will is subject to the will of the Father.⁶ Even in the Fourth Gospel there is the proof-text of the subordinationists, "The Father is greater than I"; and we find Jesus describing himself as one who does his Father's will and work, one sent by the Father, through whom men come to the Father.⁷

We shall miss a basic clue to the nature of revelation if we interpret these passages with the subordinationists. The important emphasis here is on the *work* of Christ in redemption and on the unity of his work and lordship with the work and lordship of the Father. The conclusion which the New Testament draws from the action of God in Christ is found in the other *motif* which speaks of Jesus Christ as *κύριος, θεός* and even *ὁ θεός*.⁸ "God was in Christ"; "in him dwells the whole fullness of deity bodily."⁹ He is described as the eternally existent Word (Jn. 1.1ff.), "equal with God,"¹⁰ "our great God and savior Jesus Christ," the "*ἀρχή*" and the "*τέλος*."¹¹ *Redemption* is the central fact of the Christian revelation. The religious interest in redemption passes inevitably into the interest in the person of the redeemer.

When we examine the root of the doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament witness to the Holy Spirit, we find a similar emphasis upon the activity of God in the Spirit. The meaning of Pentecost is that God has not only come to men, but has made his coming efficacious by the presence of the Spirit. The coming of God in Christ means revelation and redemption; his coming in the Holy Spirit means the *impartation* of the redemption and revelation to concrete men in concrete histori-

cal situations. This is the possibility of faith, "the subjective side in the event of revelation."¹² Lionel Thornton notes that for Paul the content of the Christian life is the indwelling Christ. "But the Spirit is never regarded as the content of the quickened life. He is the agent of revelation, who brings the content of truth to the spirit of man; and by consequence we have the mind of Christ."¹³ The Johannine view of the Spirit leans more toward the work of revelation and illumination than to redemption and sanctification. The Paraclete is the Spirit of truth, sent by the Father in the name of Christ to teach all things to those in whom he dwells.¹⁴ The sending of the Spirit by the Father and Son is consequent upon the coming of Christ; and the recognition of Jesus as Christ, Lord and Son is consequent upon the impartation of God in the Spirit. Herein is the unity of the Spirit with Father and Son.

If our understanding of the roots of the doctrine of the Trinity is correct, we can now say something about the sort of revelation which is presupposed by that doctrine. It ought to be perfectly clear that we cannot think of revelation in terms of a book or a set of propositions, but must conceive it as an event. The self-disclosure of God does not mean the impartation of statements about himself. It consists in something that happens, in God's coming into history, our history, in Christ and in the Holy Spirit. The root of the doctrine of the Trinity is not the statements of Jesus about himself, nor of the apostles about him, but the activity of God to which these statements bear witness. The Bible is not a sourcebook of revealed doctrine, but the record of an historical community of faith constituted by human response to the revelatory act of God in Christ. God himself is the truth, not the *articuli fidei*. He is "both agent and content of all revelation."¹⁵

The tragedy of identifying revelation with a "deposit of faith" or "revealed doctrine" is most clearly illustrated in biblical literalism. For the literalist the conflict of propositions of faith and of reason may become painfully acute. But this is a pseudo-conflict, in which

revelation has degenerated into idolatry. The faith of literalism is not faith in God or his action, but faith in faith, or faith in the record. This concept of revelation is not only contrary to the real character of the Christian revelation, but it is open to the charge that doctrinal formulations are largely irrelevant to the continuing Christian experience. It is interesting to compare St. Augustine and St. Thomas at this point. Augustine was a literalist, but the basis and point of departure for his understanding of the Trinity was always the temporal sending of the Son and the giving of the Spirit, i.e., the concrete historical events to which the Scriptures bear witness.¹⁶ Aquinas, on the other hand, begins with the received tradition, the doctrine, as normative. The proposition that God is a Trinity of Father, Son and Spirit is not a part of our finite reflection on revelation, but the truth of the proposition itself is revealed. The content of Thomas' doctrine is not greatly different from that of Augustine, but the changes in order of development are significant. The *mission* of the divine persons is treated last, and the *Tractatus* opens with an abstract discussion of how there can be a trinity in intelligent being.¹⁷

The damage which such a false concept of revelation can do is apparent. When theology takes leave of its proper root in the experience of the community, its doctrinal statements may well appear irrelevant and unimportant to the members of that group. When propositions based on revelation are distinguished *sui generis* from propositions of reason, the unity of thought is threatened. Most important, the availability of the revelation as a center of interpretation for the whole of experience is seriously qualified.

Revelation is properly the act of self-unveiling and self-impartment of God. The Incarnation, urged Athanasius, is the extension of creation. The same must be said of revelation, which because of sin "takes on the form of a redemptive or saving process."¹⁸ It is not simply a disclosure of what was there all the time, but the creation of a new relationship. Thus generically, revelation might be defined

as "*the creating and exhibiting of momentous and decisive relationships between transcendent reality and finite selves*,"¹⁹ the establishment of these relationships being judged to be the action of God.

The response of finite selves in the new relationship is what we call faith. If our understanding of revelation is at all correct, then it is clear that neither revelation nor faith refer simply to the cognitive relation of man to God. Faith is an existential relationship, expressing the set of the whole self. The primary relation of selves to objective reality is not theoretical but practical, not cognitive but volitional. Thus Erich Frank describes faith as a struggle with God, in which the person seeks primarily not to understand but to deal with that which transcends and limits him.²⁰ From this it does not follow that the knowledge relation and reason are simply derivative and accidental. On the contrary, *knowledge of the real is essential to coping with the real, but it is the coping with the real which is basic*. In the tradition of Paul and Luther, "faith seeking understanding" means that in the struggle with God we come to know him with whom we have to deal. Our language about God is significant *because it derives from the practical or existential relation in which we stand to him*, and because it also describes that relationship. As "a primary mode of apprehension of and relationship to God,"²¹ faith is different from belief, or "faith in something"; it is a bond of ontological and metaphysical character. Yet since our finite selves are knowing, thinking, and believing selves, faith is conditioned by and inclusive of knowledge, thought and belief.

II

In its cognitive aspect, the revelatory moment is itself a rational principle, a first principle of explanation, "that part of our inner history which illuminates the rest of it and which is itself intelligible."²² We cannot say that revelation is opposed to reason, for our reason is a part of our response in faith. Neither can we say that revelation is subject to reason, for revelation gives "to the mind the

impulsion and the first principles it requires . . . to do its proper work."²³ Rational analysis cannot question the "truth" of the revelation, but only the validity of the theological reflection which seeks to interpret revelation. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity is in a sense twice removed from the revelation—it is an interpretation of the meaning of affirmations (themselves interpretations) about Christ and the Holy Spirit. The doctrine, as a product of reflection, is subject to rational criticism. This critical effort takes two forms, corresponding generally to the fields of dogmatic theology and philosophical theology.

1. *The aim of dogmatic theology is the explication and rationalization of the content and meaning of revelation.* Such explication shares with secular philosophy the methodological principles of coherence and comprehensiveness. We see this clearly in the Church's rejection of monarchianism and subordinationism.

Monarchianism gained credence by purporting to protect the unity of God. Dynamistic, or adoptionist monarchianism, as represented by the two Theodotii of Rome and by Paul of Samosata, was the view that the power or *dynamis* of God descended upon Jesus for a time, inspiring him and raising him to divine honor. This teaching meets all the requirements of the Apostles' Creed, but leaves the question of the nature of one who could possess the divine *dynamis*, and so was rejected as a dishonor to Christ. It was incompatible with the Church's commitment to a real doctrine of incarnation.

The other form of monarchianism, called modalistic, patripassian, or Sabellian, represented the view that the names Father, Son and Holy Spirit refer to one *ὑπόστασις* or *persona* in three aspects or appearances. These may be successive modes of appearance or ever-present aspects of God's nature, but in no case do they represent real termini or distinctions in the essence of God. The terms Father, Son, Holy Spirit are essentially interchangeable. So Tertullian charges that "Praxeas did a twofold service for the devil at Rome: he drove away prophecy, and he

brought in heresy; he put to flight the Paraclete, and he crucified the Father."²⁴ Part of the objection to patripassianism was undoubtedly that it offended the sensibilities of men dominated by a Greek concept of the immutability of God. But more important was the fact that this doctrine cannot account for that line of the Church's witness which emphasizes the subjection and distinction of the Son. It blurs out the record of the historical Jesus. The Church insisted that the revelation of God in its experience was not rooted in *accidental* manifestations of God. If his coming in Christ is truly a revelation of his nature, then that "mode" of being must be eternal in him. If his coming to men in the Holy Spirit is truly a revelation of his nature, then that impartation must stand for what is eternal in Him. God can be revealed to us as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit because he is so eternally in himself. Otherwise, the events on which the Christian community is founded lose their ultimate significance; they become only an appearance. So Tertullian asks: "What need would there be of the gospel . . . if thenceforth the Father, the Son and the Spirit are not believed in as three, and as making One Only God? God was pleased to renew His covenant with man in such a way as that His unity might be believed in, after a new manner, through the Son and the Spirit."²⁵ Tertullian's formula, designed to exclude all monarchianism, was *una substantia, tres personae*. Father, Son and Holy Spirit are eternally distinct as *personae*, members of the divine *οικονομία*, economy or dispensation.²⁶

It was the fear of Sabellianism which made Arianism plausible, for the latter doctrine made capital of the distinctness of Father, Son and Spirit. Arius and his followers developed that aspect of Origen's teaching which labeled the Son as "the firstborn of every creature", and inferior to the Father.²⁷ The rallying cry of the subordinationists was "there was when He was not," or "once the Son was not." Arius defines God as the Creator, the one without beginning, unoriginate and uncreated. But this is interpreted to mean "unbegotten", and

the *essence* of God is held to be *unbegottenness*. The Son is "begotten", hence only secondarily divine, the firstborn of all creatures, *our* creator and our redeemer, nevertheless a creature.

The ultimate consequence of this doctrine is made clear by the relentless attacks of Athanasius. If the Son is not of the essence of the Father, he cannot be truly like the Father. Those who say that the Son is like the Father in all things, but deny that he is *ὁμοούσιος* are either sadly confused or downright deceitful. The Son is either creature or God—there is no intermediate class—if God then he is truly so and of the essence of the Father; if a creature, then he is unlike the Father. In the end, the extreme Arian leader, Eunomius, did come to assert the absolute unlikeness of Father and Son.

One of the basic motivations of Arianism was the desire to avoid Sabellianism at all costs. The other interest was that of making Christianity rational. If Father and Son are distinct, thought Arius, the only way to preserve the unity of God is to place that unity in the Father and subordinate the Son and the Spirit. The charge which Athanasius brings against Arius is that subordinationism does not really protect this unity; it succeeds only in denying the ground of our salvation. If Arius admits that the Son is *our* Creator and Redeemer, then he must be God *for us*, whatever his relation to the Father. Now see who is the polytheist and the irrationalist! We have God the Father and God the Son—two Gods, differing in essential being. More important to Athanasius' mind is the interest in making our salvation sure. The demand for rationality must not be permitted to obscure the demands of religious adequacy. That is, the function of reason is to explicate, not deny, the experience of the community. If Christ be truly the redeemer, he cannot be a creature; he must be truly God, and eternally so. The justification of the term *ὁμοούσιος* rests in its exclusion of all attempts to reduce the Son to creaturehood, hence finally in the guaranteeing of the efficacy of the work of Christ.

Defeated on the issue of the consubstan-

tiality of the Son, the subordinationist forces turned their attention to the Holy Spirit, but their effort was doomed from the start, for it is clear that the same arguments hold for the Spirit as for the Son. The logical culmination of the doctrinal development is found in the words of the Quicunque Vult:

"we worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. For there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit; but the Godhead of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, the glory equal, the majesty co-eternal . . . there are not three eternal, but one eternal; just as there are not three infinities nor three uncreated, but one uncreated and one infinite. . . . So the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, yet there are not three Gods, but one God. . . ."

The history of the evolution of the doctrine of the Trinity is the story of the apprehension and the explication of the meaning of revelation. The doctrine is the answer of reflection in faith to the question, What do the data of our Christian experience (i.e., the coming of God in Christ and the Holy Spirit) imply for the nature of God? This explication is largely confessional. In itself it has ultimate significance only for those within the community of faith. The work of reason is here carried on only from the participating point of view.

2. *But Christian theology has never been purely confessional. If our understanding of the nature and significance of revelation is correct, there are at least two reasons why theology cannot be simply confessional.* First, revelation is the self-giving, the self-disclosure of God; its content is the eternal. It is true that our view of God is a function of our relation to him in Christ. That is, our view of God, the absolute, is relative, both historically and religiously, to our point of view. But it is still for us a view of the *absolute*, and our theological reflection must take some account of other views of the absolute and our relation to them. Second, while the truth of revelation cannot finally be established by any human activity, that truth is exhibited in the application and explication of the rational pattern which the

revelation offers. The truth of revelation is *exhibited* in the illumination which it gives to the problems of human existence, its ability to lead to other truths, and the power which it can bring for individual and social transformation.²⁸

The exhibition of the truth of revelation in relation to other points of view is the work of what we may call philosophical theology. We do not assume here that we can somehow take leave of our presuppositions and consider all viewpoints objectively, i.e., test the validity of revelation on the basis of other principles. Christian theology can know nothing of such external prior principles. Philosophical theology shares the presuppositions of the Christian faith, but differs from dogmatics in taking up a conscious and explicit relation to other points of view. This effort will be partly negative, as in relation to the metaphysical absolutisms or "pure rationalisms" which would deny *a priori* the possibility of revelation. Here philosophical theology may be interested to show that all philosophical thinking rests on key ideas, valuations, or presuppositions which stand for it in the place of revelation—and that the principle of selection of such key data is not given by the methodological norms of coherence and comprehensiveness.²⁹ Philosophical theology may insist that the truth that matters is saving truth, and that metaphysical systems must be relevant to the concrete practical problems of existence.

On the other hand, if the truth of revelation is exhibited in the illumination of all human experience, theology must seek to establish a positive relationship with philosophical and metaphysical efforts. Theology will seek to show how the truth of other systems is fulfilled, taken up or converted by the truth of revelation.³⁰ Again, we cannot step outside the presupposition of revelation and test its adequacy as compared with other presuppositions, but from the point of view of faith we can indicate how revelation illuminates the practical and intellectual problems of our existence, leads to other truths and offers transforming power.

III

We have seen that the *terminus a quo* of the doctrine of the Trinity is its root in revelation and faith. The problem of faith and reason appears at the *terminus ad quem* in the question of the relation of our language about God to the nature of God in himself. What is the significance of the terms *persona*, subsistence, *hypostasis* and relation? In what sense can trinitarian formulae devised by finite minds represent the infinite being of God? The answer to this problem is generally found in the concept of analogy. The important question is, *what sort of analogy?* Christian theology has nearly always insisted that the Trinity is a mystery, yet insisted also that our language about the Trinity has more than a metaphorical significance.

On one side, this problem is related to the medieval controversy over universals. Any assertion that in the nature of God there is triunity or genuine distinction in unity involves the rejection of nominalism and radical conceptualism. It is evident furthermore that the affirmation of the triune nature of God is not to be understood in purely negative terms. The statement that there is in God a three-ness does not mean simply that he is not a bare unity; nor does the confession of the unity of God involve simply a denial of plurality. The history of the doctrine of the Trinity is the history of the search for terms which can express positively the character of the unity and of the distinction. This is clearly the intent of Tertullian's classic statement that God is three "not in condition (*statu*) but in degree, not in substance but in form, not in power but in aspect (*specie*); yet of one substance and of one condition, inasmuch as He is one God, from whom these degrees and form and aspects are reckoned."³¹

Nevertheless, there is truly a negative element in all the affirmations. This is most clearly evident in the fact that many of the terms of trinitarian theology were introduced and justified as a means of combatting error. *Persona* was chosen by Tertullian to designate

the depth of the distinctions in such a way as to rule out monarchianism. The ordinary translation of *persona* into Greek was *πρόσωπον*, but this meant primarily face or appearance, and when combined with *ὁμοούσιος* was strongly suggestive of Sabellianism. It was in order to guard against such heresy that *ὑπόστασις* came to be used by the Greek theologians in reference to the divine *personae*; *ὁμοούσιος* was included in the Nicene creed as a device for excluding Arianism. The presence of this negative *motif* shows clearly that while the trinitarian formulae are intended as veridical descriptions of God's nature, they are not unqualifiedly or univocally so. Augustine freely confesses that the meaning of *persona*, when used of the Trinity, is obscure, and justifies our use of the term "because we wish some one word to serve for that meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, that we might not be altogether silent, when asked what three, while we confessed that they are three."⁸²

It is unfortunate that when we speak of "analogies of the Trinity" we usually think of the numerous illustrations of three-in-oneness in the created world. The most promising effort in this direction is found in the last half of Augustine's *de Trinitate*. But Augustine specifically wants us to understand that these analogies have very serious faults and that they are intended only as supplementary to the traditional formulations, helpful primarily to the imagination. We need to recognize the value of such illustrative analogies, but within proper limits. Their usefulness is consequent upon a prior understanding and statement of trinitarian doctrine; they are intended and valuable as partial and imperfect illustrations of *certain aspects of our language about God*. When used as direct analogies of the Trinity, they become misleading. Furthermore, this sort of analogy puts the emphasis in the wrong place, on the abstract problem of three-in-oneness. A more fruitful approach lies in the attempt to specify first, on the basis of the historical revelation, what *sort* of distinction and what *sort* of unity is implied in the nature of God. This is the function of trinitarian formulae.

The words *persona*, *ὑπόστασις*, relation, mode, subsistence and person must properly be considered in terms of analogy. In Tertullian's formula, the word *persona* is drawn from the law courts and the stage, where it refers to a participant in a dispute or a role in a drama. *Tres personae* means that in the divine economy there are three eternal roles or functions filled by Father, Son and Spirit. This distinction of function or economy clearly stresses the unity of God. The formula of the East, *μία οὐσία, τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις*, tends in the opposite direction. *Hypostasis* means concrete independence or actuality, as contrasted with mere appearance or attribute, and the illustration offered by the Cappadocian fathers was of three men, bound together in the unity of essence, manhood. This illustration, at least, makes the distinction too complete, and needs the corrective of the Latin formula. Augustine suggests that the distinction is one of relations: the Father is one with the Son and the Holy Spirit in substance, action and attribute, but called Father *in relation to* the Son and Spirit, etc. In recent theology, we find Karl Barth reserving the word person for the unity of God, and distinguishing Father, Son and Spirit as three modes of existence—God as veiled, God as revealed and God as imparted. Hodgson, however, insists that we must speak of three persons in the fully modern sense of the term, and revise our concept of unity, taking our analogy from the organic unities of concrete reality rather than from the bare unity of mathematics.

Each of these terms expresses something essential in the Church's witness to God, but each imperfectly and only in part. That is, each is an analogical description, or, to speak more precisely, each provides analogical material for expressing what we understand to be the truth. What we are saying when we speak of three modes (e.g., hypostatic modes) in God is that the relation of the three-ness to the being of God is analogous to the relation of modes of finite existence to that of which they are modes. The relation of Father, Son or Spirit to the triune being of God is thus also analogous

to the relation of a person to a society of persons, of a subsistence to that in which it is a subsistence, of a *persona* to that in which it participates as a party or actor, and of a relation to its terms.³³ I.e.:

$$\frac{\text{God's three-ness (F, S, Hs)}}{\text{His being (trinity, both unity and "plurality")}} = \frac{\text{Finite mode}}{\text{finite existent}} = \frac{\text{relation}}{\text{terms}}$$

$$= \frac{\text{person}}{\text{society of persons}} = \frac{\text{subsistent entity}}{\text{that in which it subsists}}$$

Notice that we are *not* saying here: a) that a finite mode is proportional to finite existence as a divine mode is proportional to the divine existence.. (E.g. as M. Penido suggests:

$$\frac{\text{personne créée}}{\text{être potentiel}} = \frac{\text{personne incréée³⁴}}{\text{être sans potentiel}}$$

This is obviously true (and perhaps useful in philosophical theology) but does not really give us any information about God. Nor are we saying b) that the relation of God's three-ness to his unity, is like that of *personae* to *substantia* or *hypostasis* to *ousia*.

$$\text{I.e.: } \frac{\text{divine personae}}{\text{divine substantia}} \text{ or } \frac{\text{God's 3-ness}}{\text{God's unity}} =$$

$$\frac{\text{created personae}}{\text{created substantia}} = \frac{\text{finite hypostasis}}{\text{finite essence}}$$

This is a falsification of the analogies, for the formula, *una substantia, tres personae* is not one analogy, but in a sense two: an analogy referring to the unity of God (*substantia*) and an analogy relating to the three-ness of God (*personae*, etc.). To confuse these two as one is to return to the sort of (illustrative) analogy we rejected above.

We cannot say that the relation of the divine "persons" to the being of God is *identical* with the relation of a person to a society of persons, etc., because we are attempting to present an analogue of the transcendent in the form of the finite. We cannot compare our analogue directly with that to which it refers, for the essence of God is not apprehended in any direct way. But we can and do test our analogies because we stand in an actual relation to God,

constituted by the Incarnation and the gift of the Spirit. This relation the analogy ultimately seeks to express. The test of the analogy is its appropriateness to the divine-human relation, the revelation, but its value and significance rests also on what is expressed about the nature of the analogates. Kant, you will remember, asserted that we can legitimately attribute properties to God's relation to the world, but we cannot extend our judgments to the nature of the transcendent itself.³⁵ Our contention is precisely the opposite, viz., that if we know the relation, from our participation in it, we must know something of the terms. Christian theology cannot accept the notion that the relation of God to the world in the Incarnation is wholly external to God himself. Herein is the transition from an economic to an immanent trinitarianism. The doctrine of an immanent trinity rests on the insistence that the divine-human relation in Christ implies a ground in the nature of God, and that knowledge of the relation gives us knowledge of God in himself.

The primary implications of this study for the problems of faith and reason may be summarized under the following heads:

1. The terms revelation and faith refer to an ontological or existential relationship of man to God. Revelation is the self-giving of God in Christ and the Holy Spirit, the creation of a new relationship; faith is the response of finite selves to this action.

2. The appropriation of this relationship provides for man a principle of explanation, a new understanding of God, himself and the world. This is the illumination of the Spirit. An integral part of the response of faith is the rational explication of the new understanding and its relation to other points of view.

3. Insofar as the explication refers to the nature of God, it properly takes the form of an analogy—an analogy which is both validated and limited by its character as an interpretation of the actual relationship of the whole self to God in Christ and the Holy Spirit.

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 3. Cf. for example *de Synodis*, pt. III.
 4. *Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.*, 4th ed., 1909, vol. 1, p. 90 n.
 5. II Cor. 5.19.
 6. Mk. 10.18; 14.36; 15.34.
 7. Jn. 14.28; 17.3; 14.6; Cp. I Cor. 15.24.
 8. Hebrews 1.5 ff.
 9. II Cor. 5.19; Col. 2.9 Cf. Col. 1.19; Phil. 2.6.
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 23. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
 24. *Adversus Praxeas*, I.
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 27. *Contra Celsum*, VI. 47 f., VIII 14 f.
 28. Cf. H. R. Niebuhr, *op. cit.*, p. 141; and Nels Ferré, *Faith and Reason* (N. Y., Harper, 1946), p. 243.
 29. Cf. Ferré, *op. cit.*, p. 122 ff.
 30. Cf. L. Thornton, *op. cit.*, for an excellent example of this effort. The book combines elements of dogmatic and philosophical theology.
 31. Tertullian, *op. cit.*, 2.
 32. *de Trinitate*, VII. 11.
 33. L. Thornton notes that the analogies fall into two basic types: the social, from the theology of sonship (Athanasius and the Cappadocians), and the psychological, from the Logos theology. Both types root in the New Testament and both are present in Augustine.
- The basic problem of trinitarian theology in every age is the arrangement of these terms in a scale of adequacy, depending upon their meanings for contemporary thought.
34. M. Penido, *Le Role de L'Analogie en Theologique Dogmatique* (Paris, 1931), p. 337.
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Two Levels of Faith and Reason

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FAITH" and "reason" are vague terms. Faith in general is trust, and this means, doing our part in the system of things with confidence that the rest of the system will do its part, at least to the extent that we shall not have striven simply in vain. What Santayana calls "animal faith" is the confidence of every sentient creature in its environment as favorable to its efforts to live and continue its species. Faith on the human level is trust that the nature of things insures the appropriateness of ideals of generosity, honesty, and aesthetic refinement, or goodness, truth, and beauty, to such an extent that despite all frustrations and vexations, despite disloyalty or crassness in our fellows, despite death itself, it is really and truly better to live, and to live in accord with these ideals, than to give up the struggle in death or in cynicism. Of this human faith there are varieties almost beyond telling: the great religious faiths, and the various attempted philosophical substitutes for these.

Reason in general is either a mere tracing of the consequences of ideas, whether true or false, that is, mere deduction, as in mathematics, or an attempt to estimate the truth of ideas by the honest weighing of evidence, the most accurate attainable estimation of "pros and cons." This weighing of evidence has two main forms or levels: the inductive

reasoning of science and everyday life; and the presumed reasoning, not easy to classify, which is at work in the construction of systems of metaphysics and theology.

We can now render our question of the relation of faith to reason somewhat more definite, as follows: how are the processes of deduction, and of weighing of evidence (on the two levels mentioned), related to trust in the environment as an adequate basis for our efforts to live in accordance with certain ideals? At once, we note that deducing consequences of ideas, and weighing evidence for ideas, are themselves modes of behavior, and of these modes, as of any others, we must ask, what is their ideal, and is the world such that this ideal is practicable? For if it is not, why should we bother to study mathematics or to pursue inductive science or metaphysics? As has been often remarked, the entire life of man, including quite especially his intellectual life, is the expression of faith or trust, for example, trust that the human discovery of truth is possible and worth striving for. Since this is the case, there is an absurdity in supposing that faith is unjustified until and unless it can find evidence to support it. To look for evidence is to express one's trust in the value of evidence. The most basic animal and human faith is beyond need of justification. Even suicide expresses the trust that to die is, in certain cases at least, better than to live. What needs justification is not faith in general, for to think, as to live, is already to accept faith as valid. What needs justification is only the choice of *which* faith, which verbal and intellectual and perhaps institutional, ritualistic, and artistic form of expression and intensification we shall seek to give the faith we inevitably have. Here truly we do need justification, not merely by faith, but of faith. Is there any way to achieve this, if not by deducing the conse-

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quences of various interpretations of the content of faith, and examining the arguments for and against each? The only alternative is to put unlimited trust in our luck in having been born into the right religion, or in our capacity to make the right choice without any careful consideration of relevant arguments.

In the comparison of diverse faiths, reason asks us to be technically neutral; that is to say, whatever may be the particular form of faith we happen to incline to, we ought to reason as if we had no such inclination. It is obvious that nothing is humanly more difficult than to achieve such neutrality of reasoning. Here—as Niebuhr points out—is a mighty ambiguity in the term “reason.” It means one thing so far as it designates an ideal of thinking, and something more or less radically different so far as it stands for this or that man’s practice of thinking. The ideal neutrality which reasoning calls for is only an ideal, so far as man is concerned. He tries to play fair as between the faith he would like to justify and rival faiths, but scarcely can he ever wholly succeed. Here is the element of truth in the disparagement of “reason” often expressed by men of faith. What we actually have is not “reason” but various alleged reasonings. They are genuine reasonings so far as evidences and counter evidences are both honestly considered, but for the rest they are pseudo-reasonings, pretences to face evidence where the reality is lacking. But granted all this, are not the men of faith in the same human boat along with the rest of us? If they renounce reason in favor of resting content with their own form of faith, on what ground do they claim validity for this form? If they say, we have received it directly or indirectly from God himself who cannot deceive or be in error, the question is, by what mode of human response to a divine message could the possibility of error be ruled out? If alleged reasonings are often pseudo-reasonings, alleged receptions of revealed messages are often pseudo-receptions, as is proved by their mutual disagreements, and in other ways. And if it be said, ah! but original

sin and the fall of man condemn human thinking to perversion, must this not be at least as true of human reception of divine revelation? The message is divine, but we miserable human wretches must receive and interpret it if it is to become our own living faith.

In at least one sense, however, it seems correct to say that faith transcends rational justification. After we have weighed the evidences as best we can, the question is: how conclusive is the result? Rational neutrality may remain at the end as it is obligatory at the beginning of the process. And yet a living faith we need, and something more definite than the mere general faith that somehow it is all right for us to live and try to do our best. Such complete vagueness is not practicable, and it means that the content of the word “best” also remains all too vague. So it seems that each individual must carry on such reasoning as he has opportunity and leisure to effectuate, and then “take a chance” on the best guess he can make. His reasoning may seem to favor this faith over that, but inconclusively. Yet his life of faith can hardly be equally undecided. Or can it? And is such indecision desirable? At least, it should, as Niebuhr says, survive in our practical faith in the form of tolerance. Since I am not rightfully certain, I cannot set down the disagreements of others with me as simply so many errors. I may practice my own ritual with cheerful confidence, but I ought not to condemn you uncharitably, or with a sense of personal infallibility, for similarly practicing yours. And I ought not to condemn myself too definitively, or my children, to persistence in that ritual unchanged, should new evidences become apparent to me.

There are two chief areas in which the relations of the various faiths with reason are today critical. There is the area of contact between faith and contemporary metaphysics, and that of contact between faith and the social sciences. Not being a social scientist, I hesitate to discuss the second of these areas. Lundberg’s *Can Science Save Us?* states the

problem brilliantly, and should be widely read by theologians. Certainly it will not do to say that science merely invents machines and only faith can tell us how to use these machines. For psychology, psychiatry, anthropology, sociology, scientific history, seem to tell us a good deal about the men who use machines, and can we know how men may best act if we do not know what men are, or can we know what God wishes us to do if we do not know what he has created us to be, or what, by using the freedom of choice with which he has endowed us, we have made of ourselves? I do not doubt that Dewey's constant refrain, let religious leaders stop sabotaging the efforts of social science to clarify our ideals, or let people cease to give heed to religious leaders, has enough justification to deserve more hearing than Niebuhr, for example, is willing to admit. Since the ideal of reason calls for devotion to norms of correct intellectual procedure as having pre-eminence over personal preference, and since the basic ideal of religion is selflessness, setting of superpersonal values above self-interest and selfwill, religious persons should see in social science one of the chief opportunities to exemplify religious idealism.

The contact between faith and metaphysics is a difficult, complex topic. Is metaphysics a genuine expression of reason, or are its arguments only pseudo-reasonings? I believe that metaphysics is, in ideal possibility, a genuine expression of reason, but that in historical achievement it has in good part been a failure. However, it may be questioned if revealed or orthodox theology is in better case, or is justified in scorning metaphysics. For (not to mention the competing orthodoxies) I hold that among the most successful of the efforts of metaphysicians are those which go to prove the erroneousness of certain elements in the main stream of orthodox theology, Protestant as well as Roman. Modern philosophy, with increasing unanimity and emphasis, declares that whatever the highest truth may be, it is not to be found in certain theological tenets for which almost innumerable theologians in

various churches have stood. There has, in fact, been a basic revolution in metaphysics, quite as noteworthy as the revolution in physics. I shall try to explain.

In medieval doctrine the outstanding illustrations of faith as compared to reason were seen in the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. That God is, and that he is all-knowing and supremely good, with still other attributes, could, it was held, be rationally known. But that there are three persons in the one divine substance, and that the man Jesus and the second person of the Trinity were also somehow one, though with two natures, one human and one divine, these were truths which must be taken on trust in the authority of Church and Scriptures. What is the situation today? I think it is this: philosophy is indeed sadly divided as to the rational knowability of deity, but on one thing there is as much agreement as on any, that among the attributes which the schoolmen regarded as rationally demonstrable, are some which are at least as recalcitrant to reason as the Trinity or the Incarnation. That God should be the perfection of wisdom and goodness, yet in all respects infinite, changeless, and absolute, this is if anything a more hopeless rebuke to all our rational insights than that there should be threefold personality in God. Wisdom and goodness are essentially relationships, and the wholly non-relative or purely absolute can in no intelligible sense know or intend anything; more obviously, if possible, it cannot love anything. Moreover, if God were wholly absolute and immutable, he would be less, not more, rich in fullness of being than if he were relative and mutable; for modern analysis has shown, more and more clearly, that the relative includes the absolute and more besides, or that becoming includes being as well as something additional. We have come to see that by abstracting from relations and change we can indeed conceive the absolute and the changeless, but only as something abstract and deficient in actuality or concreteness. The concrete God that metaphys-

ics finds reason to accept must be described as supreme both in relativity and in absolute-ness, both in becoming of novel values and in permanence of values once achieved, both in activity and in passivity, both in "simplicity" and in complexity. And I believe that Whitehead and others, including, if I may say so, myself, are showing that there is no contradiction in attributing to the same being both supreme relativity and supreme non-relativity, supreme permanence and supreme novelty, supreme actuality and supreme potency for further actuality. The concrete includes the abstract, and since the absolute or immutable is abstract, it can perfectly well constitute an aspect of a being which concretely or as a whole is relative and mutable.

But granting, as some perhaps would, the conceivability of such a view, can its truth be established? Here we come to the question of the arguments for the existence of God. It is said that such arguments seem cogent only to those largely convinced already. But here there is danger of converting: "it never has been done" into "it cannot be done." It is unsafe to assume that no argument for theism can ever be more cogent than those in Thomas Aquinas or in Royce—or than those set up in order to be demolished by Hume and Kant, or than the moral argument which Kant accepts. It was ages before men learned to reason well in natural science. There are problems in the logic of mathematics, and also in the logic of induction, that are not yet fully solved. I see no reason to suppose and good reason to doubt that Aquinas, Kant, or Royce were equipped to achieve finality in the exploration of the logic of the theistic problem. Metaphysics shows signs of having a future as well as a past, and as Maxwell remarked of physics, we cannot assume that the science of the future—including, I would add, metaphysical science—will be a mere magnified image of that of the past. I believe there are no fewer than six arguments for God which are capable of being so formulated as to eliminate the gravest weaknesses which critics have found in older

formulations. They may still not be coercive demonstrations, but there is something between absolute demonstration—as in mathematics—and no rational evidence at all. If the logic of natural science has proved so difficult, how do we know that the logic of metaphysics is easier to master? Perhaps even logical positivism, in spite of itself, will furnish us with tools of analysis which will strengthen rather than weaken the theistic argument as theists learn to use these tools.

Let us return to the conception of God which I have attributed to the new metaphysics. (Since it is possible to read the doctrine into Plato and Schelling, it is new only in the relative sense in which philosophical conceptions are likely to have novelty.) From the current metaphysical point of view, the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity acquire a new meaning. If God has a genuinely relative and mutable aspect, he can genuinely and literally love his creatures. It follows that a man Jesus whose life exemplifies and symbolizes love in uniquely impressive fashion can, at least in some sense (possibly in a rather attenuated one), be said to incarnate or at least symbolize the nature of deity. But further, if there is a real distinction between what is relative and what is absolute in deity, then simple monotheism, which denies all such complexity or internal difference in God, is mistaken. Also, there is a sense in which the new metaphysics implies a plurality of divine persons in the life of God. For if there is divine becoming as well as divine being, then in some real sense God is a new being every moment of his life, and since he is really a knowing and loving being, this succession of beings in God is in a sense a succession of persons. However, the number of such divine persons would presumably be infinite, not three. On the other hand, threefoldness would also remain valid, though in another sense. For besides the absolute element in deity there would be two other elements or aspects. These are: the relative element as such, that is, the generic quality of divine relativity; but also the specific divine

relationships to specific actual things or world states. Only the last would constitute God as concrete at a given moment, and in this concrete state of God the two abstract or generic elements would be contained. Thus there would, at a given moment, be the one concrete deity or divine actuality ("substance") containing three aspects, one of which is the actuality itself in its fullness, while the other two are abstract elements of this actuality. How far these three could be identified with the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, I suspect is a matter for fancy more than argument, since historical definitions of the three persons contain too many ambiguities, or are too vague, to make such argument much more than a pastime. But this much seems to have been metaphysically justifiable in the Trinitarian doctrine, that there is one divine actuality with three aspects, and that there is a plurality of divine persons in the divine life. Thus the empty bleakness of mere unity, mere undifferentiated perfection, is overcome as well, or rather, much better, in the new doctrine than in the old.

It is important to note that the language of religion is not precise with reference to philosophical problems. In about four places in the Bible God is said to be unchanging. So Jews and Christians might suppose that their religion commits them to the philosophical tenet of an immutable deity. But this is open to question. Suppose I say to a friend, I met so and so. And my friend says to me, how is he? And I say, just the same as ever. Do I literally and precisely mean what I say? Of course not. No man is ever in every respect the same at two different times. What I mean is that so and so exhibits certain traits of character that are constant. Now how do we know that the biblical writers meant that God in no sense whatever changes? Perhaps they only meant that certain traits of character, of great importance to religion, are absolutely constant and therefore wholly to be relied upon in God, say his righteousness or his wisdom. It need not follow that God in no sense or respect changes, even in those

which perhaps would make no difference to religion, or might even be favorable to it.

It is for philosophy and religion together to work out the possible senses in which deity may be conceived as changing, in spite of a certain unchangeability of character.

One cause for the erroneous view that God is "without accidents" is that his very existence must, it seems, be an accident if his actual being contains accidental factors. But this, once more, is a confusion between abstract and concrete. *That* God is concrete or actual is, I hold, necessary, but *how* he is actual, in what contingent concrete state rather than another, is not necessary. The point is that non-existence is not a possible state or accident of God. God can be in *any* contingent state, save the pseudo-state of not existing, that is, of not realizing *somehow* his eternal essence of supreme wisdom, goodness, and power.

The traditional problems of faith and reason are indeed profoundly transformed by the new metaphysics which posits in God a relative, contingent, temporal aspect and holds that this aspect is the concrete actuality of deity. But, you may say, if rational metaphysics can go so far, what of the mysteriousness of God? Surely we cannot understand him? In the first place, metaphysics is reason at its problematic limits. It is mysterious enough. In the second place, reason deals with the universal and abstract; the wholly particular and concrete can only be intuited. Thus in so far as faith, or life-trust, has something particular as its object it transcends rational evidence. Now each man has to have a sense of his own particular value in the universe and for God, and this no science and no metaphysics can give him, but only his own awareness of himself, and of the world, or God, as containing him. Rational theology may be able to show that there is a God who cherishes all his creatures; but no rational discipline can show there is a God who cherishes "me," meaning by me, the precise individual quality, incommunicable in abstract terms, that makes me different from anyone else that ever lived

or ever could have lived. That about God which reason cannot know is not the essence of God, that which he is in general terms, such as all-knowing, or loving; but the particular form that this knowing or loving takes when a given particular creature is its object. Not the essence, but the most particular of the accidents of God have to be felt rather than demonstrated, if we can know them at all. Even God's relation to the human race is outside the province of metaphysics and must either be deduced from anthropological data, or from the depths of personal intuition, one's own or someone else's.

This whole matter was misconceived for centuries, for at least two reasons: God was thought to have an essence which forbade that he have accidents, anything additional to his eternal and inevitable being, anything temporal or non-necessary; further, it was thought that metaphysics could support only some of the essential attributes which religion ascribes to God. For instance, it was thought that we might know metaphysically the immateriality of God, but not that he is loving or personal. The newer metaphysics holds that it is the general essence of God that he have particular accidental properties which must be transcendent to metaphysical reasoning; on the other hand, lovingness and personality are seen to be just as well supported by metaphysical reasoning as any other attributes. Even the great message of the cross, that the divine suffers, is a truism for metaphysics as I conceive it. It *could not* be that an inclusive mind excluded the suffering of the world from itself. Nothing is more irrational than the notion of an all-knowing mind that does not know suffering, in the only conceivable way in which suffering can be known—by feeling it. In order to have the idea of a divine presence in our human suffering there is no need that metaphysics be supplemented by revelation. What escapes metaphysical reason is something that cannot be stated in purely general abstract terms, like "suffering" or "personality." Such, for example, are the particular forms of suffering

which are yours or mine, or the sufferings of a certain remorseful sinner, and the particular response of feeling to these particular sufferings which takes place in God. Aside from the metaphysically knowable essence of God there are, then, two main aspects of religious truth: first, the accidents of God—in relation to the world as itself accidental—so far as these accidents are abstractly knowable, and second, these accidents so far as they are too concrete or particular to be accessible except to incommunicable intuition or perhaps poetic and artistic, but not conceptual, expression. The abstractly knowable accidents are in principle open to scientific inquiry. Thus if God forgives man his sins, anthropology and metaphysics together should be able to make some sense out of this proposition and find some evidence for it. But what *my* sins may be, which God forgives, surely no science will ever quite know that! The reason-transcending aspect of faith is the intimate, particular, personal aspect of the relations of man and God. Now to say, "God is a person and has personal relations," is to talk in abstract general terms, and to betray no personal intimacy whatever. Brunner actually seems unable to distinguish between the quite impersonal proposition, God is a person, and the revelation of a particular personal act or decision of God in reference to a particular creature. To say, "there are intimacies," is not to reveal any intimacy, any more than to say there are secrets is to let any 'cat out of the bag.'

In sum, metaphysical reason can know the general nature or eternal essence of God; scientific reason can know some of the accidents of God in their more abstract aspect; personal intuition, aided by poetry, ritual, religious traditions, can know some aspects of the accidents of God too concrete, complex, or particular to be grasped by rational analysis. No doubt the aspects of God that we can know by any means are incomparably less extensive than those we cannot know (for instance those referring to the remote depths of the universe in space and time).

Even the most concrete and personal knowledge is not wholly beyond reason. It is hard to set absolute limits to analysis and intersubjective verification. We can always try, and we ought to try, to carry them further into the citadel of the concrete and particular. And in all cases faith should respect and include reason, not flout it. We may even say that any legitimate faith on the human level is a form of reason. For if reason is the critical or honest evaluation of evidence, then faith is the evaluation of evidence too personal to be utilized in science. We may thus even speak of secular and sacred reason; the one is the honest weighing of publicly accessible evidence, the other, the similar weighing of evidence available only to certain persons or groups—if you will, those who have received special divine grace.

Included in the criterion of honest weighing of evidence is the requirement of consistency. No evidence, public or private, can support a contradiction, as such. For this would simply mean that the evidence confirms and also disconfirms a certain proposition, and that would amount to saying that we have no idea what the evidence confirms. Those, for example, who think to exalt God by saying that he is in all respects without accidental properties, yet that he has infallible knowledge of accidental beings, fail to tell us what proposition they claim the right to believe in. For to know that that exists which might not have existed is to have knowledge that might not have been had, that is, it is to have accidental knowledge. Suppose what might not have existed had not existed, surely then the infallible knower would not have known that it did exist, for this would have been to know falsely. So this sort of theologizing only amounts to saying, evidence, profane or sacred, gives us the right to believe that there is an infallible knowledge of accidental being and that there is no such knowledge—and this can only mean that the evidence gives us no right to believe either proposition. The question, "what do you claim the right to believe?" is really left unanswered.

I have assumed so far in this paper that metaphysics is an expression of reason, is a legitimate rational enterprise. But if this assumption is really sound, why is distrust of metaphysics so widespread? There are many reasons, but, I hold, no conclusive justification for this distrust. One reason is the question-begging argument, the inductive method has given us all our dependable knowledge, hence metaphysics, which is not inductive, is not dependable. In the first place, it is false that all dependable knowledge is inductive; for the method of mathematics is not properly so described. The correct principle here is that all things that are of one basic logical class should be investigated by one method. Now concrete things and mathematical patterns are not of one logical type, hence the difference between the inductive method of the one and the deductive method of the other. Metaphysics studies a third logical class of entities, the universal categories of all actual and conceivable worlds. Physics studies this actual world; mathematics studies patterns each of which represents a feature of certain possible worlds (including perhaps the actual one—the mathematician does not care as to that); the metaphysician studies the most utterly basic features of experience and thought which are presupposed by any world whatever and by any truth whatever. This is logically a different type of question from either of the other two, and it calls for a different method.

What is this method? Here we find another apparent ground for the distrust of metaphysics. All reasoning is supposed to be either inductive or merely deductive. If it is deductive, then either it derives consequences from indubitable premises, or its results are purely hypothetical. But these are not exhaustive divisions. Metaphysics is not a deduction of consequences either from axioms dogmatically proclaimed true nor yet from mere arbitrary postulates or hypotheses. It is an attempt to describe the most general aspects of experience, to abstract from all that is special in our awareness, and to report

as clearly and accurately as possible upon the residuum. In this process deduction from defined premises plays a role, but not the role of expanding the implications of axioms. The great historical error was to suppose that some metaphysical propositions have only to be announced to be seen true, and hence all their implications must be beyond questioning. The true role of deduction in metaphysics is not to bring out the content of the initially certain, but to bring out the meaning of tentative descriptions of the metaphysically ultimate in experience so that we shall be better able to judge if they do genuinely describe this ultimate. Axioms are not accepted as self-evident, then used to elicit consequences that must not be doubted. They are rather set up as *questions* whose full meanings only deduction of the consequences of possible answers can tell us.

When we know the meaning of the possible answers, we may, if we are lucky, be able to see that one of them is evidently true to that residuum of experience which is left when all details variable in imagination have been set aside. Thus self-evidence or axiomatic status is the goal of the inquiry, not its starting point. Metaphysical deduction justifies its premises by the descriptive adequacy of its conclusions; it does not prove the conclusions by assuming the premises. In this, metaphysics is like inductive science. The difference is that "verification" in metaphysics is not through details but through what is left when all details are treated as indifferent. Metaphysics is not quantitative, because quantities are details of the world. Even the most general quantitative constants are details, with reference to all time and all space, and with reference to all possible worlds.

The relation of metaphysics to God is not hard to see. For (as nearly all theologians have conceived him) God is no detail of existence, but is precisely the individual whose individuality must be expressed in any possible world (which could only be a possible product of his creative power). The everlasting, omnipresent, ungenerated individual is either non-entity, or he must be exhibited by the

metaphysical residuum which survives the elimination of detail. God is the only individual whose essential individuality is as general as any universal; he is the one universal individual. (It can, I think, be shown, that this involves no fatal paradox.) If metaphysics knows anything, it must either know God, or know that the idea of God is meaningless. Neutrality as to God means no metaphysics. The choice is a theistic metaphysics, or a positivistic rejection of both God and metaphysics. This choice is not an easy one. Only the future can resolve it to the general satisfaction of thinking minds. But I believe that in such systems as that of Whitehead our age has achieved great advances over all earlier ages in the analysis of the metaphysical issues.

What value has all this for a practical living faith? This question can be only slightly developed here. But a God who genuinely loves and genuinely becomes or acquires novel values has a relevance to human aspiration that a merely absolute and changeless deity cannot have. This relevance is partly this: that the great problem of the transitoriness of all our values receives the simplest and most intelligible of all conceivable solutions. A God who cherishes us and is not once for all complete, but ever enriched with new values, can and rationally would acquire value from his awareness of our experiences as they occur. The universal ocean of creaturely experience forms the ever-growing content of the divine contemplation. We contribute to God, as a 'reasonable, holy and living sacrifice' our very actuality of human experience. You may say, but God is so superior he does not need this. The superior has to think about something, and the more varied and joyous the world he contemplates the more richness of joy would he as a sympathetic spectator derive from it. The humanistic ideal of the good life for man on earth is fully embraced in the religious ideal thus interpreted, but without the futility of an existence which consists in purely transitory moments of experience enjoyed by generations each of which is

almost wholly unconscious of the wealth of experience of previous generations, and over all of which hangs the apparently inevitable doom that there must sometime be a last generation, as the earth for some astronomical or other reason becomes uninhabitable for man; or, if he has been able to leave the earth in a space ship, such ship, or the new planet repaired to, must sooner or later in the infinite long run prove the grave of the race, whose energies will then have left, for all we can know, not a single valuable trace upon the face of the cosmos—not a trace unless indeed all the human living as actually lived has passed into the imperishable reservoir of enjoyed experiences which is the divine life. Then there is no futility; for our very being will always be there, with that of our children and all we have helped to the good life, in the transparency of the divine memory, the cherisher of all achieved actualities.

Note that this is not conventional personal immortality, nor yet conventional impersonal immortality. It does not mean that we shall (I do not say we shall not either) wake up in heaven and go forth to new adventures, or wake up in hell to be punished. It means that the personal adventures we enjoyed on earth can never, in God's sight and in his actual enjoyment of them, be a whit less than they were as they occurred. The book of my

human life, or of yours, will with death achieve perhaps its final chapter, but the entire book as written will nevermore cease to be and to be cherished for all the value of personality that was in it. Thus to the question, since all roads lead to the grave (individual and for all we know racial) what is the long-run objective of human endeavor? the new metaphysics gives us a direct answer, which does not require us to stretch straws of evidence supporting personal immortality, as usually conceived, hopelessly beyond anything that reason can vouch for, but requires only that the idea of God, by no means equally barren of rational support, be interpreted in a manner which seems on every ground the most reasonable—even abstracting from the human need for permanence.

Since metaphysicians are far from agreed on such matters, one cannot say that these are definitive results of rational method. One can only say that some of the most competent of recent philosophers, doing the best they can with the evidence, have come to this type of doctrine as the most reasonable. Theologians of repute, including at least one noted for his conservative inclinations, have told me that they are by no means sure that the Christian faith requires a different idea of God or of immortality. Perhaps our forefathers were neither so right nor so wrong as the orthodox—or their opponents—usually suppose.

The Interdependence of Faith and Reason

WILLIAM E. KERSTETTER*

INTRODUCTION

A PHILOSOPHER should entertain "no belief with a conviction the least in excess of the evidence." So thought John Locke.¹

The philosopher admits—in theory—no ground of knowledge but reason. I recognise that, in fact, the whole human race, including the philosopher himself lives by faith alone.²

So writes Sir Arthur Balfour. Is either of these statements sound? Or must each, in some sense, be absorbed in the other?

It is the thesis of this paper that always and everywhere faith is the life blood of reason. Without faith, reason could do nothing. And that tenable faith ought always to be guided, so far as possible, by the light of reason. In short, that in all our sound believing faith and reason are interdependent.

This thesis is important for at least one theoretical and one practical reason. It is important in theory because, if a sound thesis, it undermines the position of irrational extremists, like Barth, who spurn reason, and the rationalist, empiricist extremists who overlook or minimize reason's dependence on faith or affirm the possibility of rational certainty. It is important, practically, because it destroys the dangerous illusion that science, because (it is said) it trusts nothing but empirically verified conclusions, is the only trustworthy source of knowledge, free from the farce of faith. And

it underlines the positive importance and possibility of knowledge not only in physical science but in the realms that matter most, in ethics, politics, religion and philosophy. For the truth is that science, philosophy and religion *all* rest solidly on faith.

But what do we mean by faith and reason? In this paper the term *faith* means belief not in contradiction but in excess of the precise degree of assurance warranted by the measure of probability implied by the evidence and critical thought about it. This conception of faith, then, in spite of other legitimate usages to which the term is often put, deliberately includes the concepts of religious belief, of scientific theory, hypothesis, postulate, presupposition and assumption. The thesis of this paper is clearest when these are all subsumed, since they are here conceived as forms of it, under the general term *faith* as just defined.

There are two conceptions of *reason* relevant here. One is the ideal of rational necessity as in mathematics and logic. The other is the ideal of *coherence* or adequacy in explaining and interpreting the given data. This paper affirms that, concerning matters of fact, reason does not attain certainty—and that some of our basic beliefs, while lacking certainty, are nevertheless held, in practice and as presuppositions of extended structures of belief, as though they were absolutely certain. That measure of belief which is precisely warranted by *coherent interpretation of the evidence* is what is attributed to the work of *reason*. At most then, only *necessary* truth might be defined as certain and free from faith (though some—Trueblood, Peirce, etc.—would significantly question even this). Any belief in excess of the warrant of evidence interpreted in terms of the ideal of coherence or adequacy is faith.

Since rational necessity is not attained with regard to matters of fact (and since the ideal of coherence does not give certainty), any ma-

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terial belief which is held *absolutely* is held on a measure of faith—however great, while still short of certainty, its probability may be.

The procedure in this paper is, first of all, to suggest certain presuppositions or items of faith which are at the bottom of all reasoning, which we all accept but can in no wise perfectly prove; and, in the second place, to show how reason is not only shod with the sandals of faith but that it is and ought to be crowned by faith. Finally, it will be suggested briefly that, despite its dependence on faith, reason, so far as possible, ought always to criticize its basic faiths as well as to determine our crowning beliefs.

I. PRE-REASON FAITHS

What, then, are some of the basic presuppositions of reasoning, items of faith, "inevitable beliefs," as Balfour calls them, which cannot be perfectly proved but are believed by all³—and which must be believed if reason is to function and knowledge is to grow? If there are such basic beliefs *which go far beyond the warrant of evidence* or are affirmed in the absence of it, let it be observed that, *standing at the very foundation of knowledge, they are reflected in all knowledge, so that all our knowledge is blended with faith.*

Two basic beliefs of all men (too involved for adequate treatment here), about which however there is much that remains mysterious, are our inevitable beliefs in a real world to which we trust our ideas refer and in the existence of other minds like our own. Though philosophers endlessly dispute the difficult issues which these beliefs involve, the thing which stands most beyond dispute is that much remains obscure. And that, despite the obscurity and mystery, we hold these beliefs *absolutely*—surely, therefore, with *faith* that exceeds our rational arguments and our understanding. And on such fundamental faiths our reasoning and our knowledge move.

But not only do we hold absolutely these beliefs in the actual world and in other minds like our own. We make the equally significant affirmation, which seems utterly to evade the grasp of any proof, that our ways of thought

are such as to be able to grasp and interpret the world's ways. We assume that the world has a meaning and that its meaning is discernible to our minds. In other words, we take it for granted at the outset that this believed external world is put together mindwise, that is, possesses meaning and a structure that is amenable to human reason. We seldom consider seriously that this actual world, which we affirm, might be ultimately unintelligible, like an unknown language, to the operating principles of reason. Lecomte du Noüy sees this possibility and the difficulty of proving the contrary. He frankly illuminates this, our plight.⁴ Even the "scale of observation" of finite minds makes their views of reality quite relative to that scale—and therefore causes the views of different minds and different "scales" to differ grossly. Yet contrary to Kant, though scarcely with conclusive proof, we assume what he questioned. We assume that the mind, ideally, is capable of grasping reality, not mere phenomena which hold us off from the noumena themselves.

All our searching assumes this. And if it did not, it would be futile and absurd. But whatever our standard of truth, our conception of reason or our method of verification may be, we can in no way verify conclusively our faith that our system of beliefs ideally does somehow represent, reflect, grasp the actual world. Assuming its existence, we find it not inconceivable that its nature might be "totally other" than amenable to interpretation in human, rational terms. Yet we always trust that reason and its ways are somehow coördinate with, somehow parallel to the ways of the real world.

Another assumption, concerning which understanding might well be tempted to throw up its arms, is the assumption of the trustworthiness of a process which lies so deeply buried in mystery and miracle. It is that process by which is effected the transformation of a physical object's activity, through sense organs, nerve centers and brains, into nonphysical, conscious sensations, images and meanings. That which can be weighed and measured is transformed, for the mind's purposes, into un-

measurable, unweighable meanings. As Professor Hartshorne has said, in his *Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation*, "It is far from obvious how there can be any kinship between mind and an electron."⁵ Though the transformation which relates them utterly escapes us, we trust that such a kinship exists. And in some common sense way, we trust this process still, even though, as science advances, it more and more tells us that the world is not what it seems to common sense and thus deepens and magnifies the mystery.⁶ So the question which Balfour puts but which cannot be lightly answered, will not down: "Why should the long train of unperceivable intermediaries that connect the perceived with the perceiver be trusted to speak the truth?"⁷ Yet with that question still unanswered, and in the face of the endless controversies between learned and discriminating epistemological dualists, monists, realists and idealists, and despite all the mystery which envelops it, common sense, science and philosophy hold fast their supreme faith in the valid revelatory character of this transforming process.

Further than this, we trust unwaveringly in the similarity of the content of consciousness in minds generally—though we know something which stands as a formidable obstacle to the purely rational justification of this belief. We know that immediate experience is ineffable. That pleasure and pain, green and blue, mean much the same thing to you and to me I can only trust; I can never prove. Impressed by the glaring fact of colorblindness, one more than suspects that our experiences somewhat vary. Yet we continue to trust that they have an essential similarity.

But this item of faith serves as the foundation for another, namely, the faith that unique centers of selfhood actually achieve trustworthy communication. Despite the difficulties involved in the ineffable character of consciousness, and despite what Trueblood calls the "insuperable"⁸ difficulties in any attempt at rational interpretation of communication, our daily living, scientific method, public verification and all philosophical discussion

take the efficacy of communication essentially for granted. Believing where we cannot understand, we make another "extraordinary compulsory assumption," as Santayana calls it.⁹ If we are not understood, as we attempt to communicate, we persist in believing that the fault is not in our stars (that is, in the nature of normal minds, their content and their ideal capacities), but in ourselves (that is, in our own lack of skill in using the vehicles provided). This is our faith, our unhesitating faith, despite the fact that the process and structure of communication, and the assumptions on which it rests, are indeed unclear.

But high in the halls of faith hangs the banner of a basic belief in whose name victory has crowded upon victory in common sense and in science. It is the belief in the thoroughgoing uniformity and regularity of nature, the belief that what happens once under certain circumstances will happen always under the same conditions. On this belief conventional science has rested securely, often dogmatically, and on this foundation has made its great advances. Scientific experiment has proceeded and prospered from this premise.

But the striking thing about it is that this belief in the uniformity of nature is a belief which captures us prior to any rational proof and holds us in spite of the fact that it can never be demonstrated as certain. We accept it before we attempt to prove it, as when a baby after a few experiences refrains from touching a hot stove. And we find, when we try to prove it, that any empirical proof we offer has weight *only if we assume what we are trying to prove*. All that is proved by repeated experiments (as Hume¹⁰ and Balfour¹¹ irrefutably show) is that such and such conditions have been followed by such and such consequences, *in the past*. To say that it logically follows that they will thus be attended by the same effects in the future and always is simply to assume the point as issue; it can never be demonstrated. At best it must always be a practical faith.

Now this is not to say that we have here a worthless faith or to deny that there appears

to be a pronounced tendency toward uniformity in nature. It is not to affirm that we should not view the future in the light of the past. It is simply to underline the fact that when we do this we are operating not on a logically grounded certainty but on a practical faith. This belief is another instinctive, inevitable belief which we cannot completely prove by reason but which we nevertheless hold with confidence. All of us hold it—in one general form or another. And the little chick, the tender babe, the savage mind and the common man cling to it with a confidence in no wise exceeded by the assurance of the sophisticated philosopher or scientist—who sometimes gives the impression that he does not trust where he cannot prove.

Not only is this so. But this practical faith of conventional science which is the basis of extended structures of scientific knowledge is today seriously challenged by discerning philosophers of science in the light of modern developments. Determinism, the belief in uniformity and predictability in the strictest sense, is currently questioned not because it is an item of faith not grounded in certainty in the first place and empirically unverifiable in the second. It is questioned because it is a faith which, in the judgment of some, is actually repudiated by *observed* data and reason.

To be sure, there is much intense *feeling* at this point.¹² But the fact that feeling is so conspicuous shows, at the very minimum, the intensity of the faith of men of reason, of science and philosophy—even where they cannot prove.¹³ Whether Russell¹⁴ or Reichenbach¹⁵ is ultimately correct in his interpretation of Heisenberg's Principle, one thing is certain (if anything is) and that is that each confidently, almost dogmatically, affirms his view. With strong feeling, Russell affirms the high probability of determinism. With equal assurance, Reichenbach asserts the improbability, yes, the impossibility of determinism.¹⁶

The real situation is this: *What can be observed* reveals the atomic world to be characterized by chance or freedom. Certain scientific laws are now understood not, in each case, as describing

an empirically observed *ideal* action in nature but rather as the *average* of many empirical measurements which, in themselves of course, vary. If to these facts we add the insights of those biologists who accept the category of purpose and those thinkers who affirm creativity, spontaneity and novelty in nature (or, as Peirce puts it, "the character of not resulting by law from something antecedent"¹⁷), we see more fully the difficulties which challenge the faith of the strict determinist.

That determinism cannot be proved in principle is clear, since, as Peirce expresses it (with Hume and Balfour), universality is "not to be attained by reasoning."¹⁸ That it is a *faith* which goes beyond the warrant of evidence is likewise clear. That it is a faith that is even at odds with the evidence seems more and more probable. Yet in spite of all, science has prospered for years on this faith; and still today notable exponents of science and reason cling to this unproved—perhaps this contradicted—belief.

And so, concerning the faith of determinism, as well as such other basic presuppositions of reason as have been noted here, we can scarcely escape the conclusion shared and expressed by Erich Frank:

Human reason, then, as modern scepticism has shown, does not rest upon itself. Rational conclusions are dependent on certain premises which reason itself is unable to prove because they are rooted in a deeper stratum of the human mind. They spring from a more or less unconscious belief or instinct, the justification of which is one of the principal tasks of the philosopher. . . . Even our rational arguments are based on a vague belief, on a trust or instinct or feeling of which we can give no further account.¹⁹

It is not the contention of this paper that these basic beliefs are devoid of all rational justification. It is rather that, despite the *measure* of reason and understanding that may be brought to their support, they are often shrouded in mystery and fall short of certainty. And because they are presuppositions which we nevertheless hold absolutely, they are held in good measure by faith.

And thus it is that reason cannot say to

faith, "I have no need of thee." Without faith, reason can do nothing. It is prostrate. It has no legs to stand on. It cannot move. But walking on the foundation of such pre-reason convictions it can move out bit by bit and push back the darkness of the dim unknown.

II. POST-REASON FAITH

But this is not all. Even as it walks on the sandals of faith, reason must be crowned with the crown of faith. If, without basic faith, reason has no legs to stand on, then without crowning faith, reason has no arms with which to reach upward or feel its way forward. Reason, to be fruitful, must begin and end in faith. Moving on the feet of pre-reason faith, reason must go as far as it can. But if it is to continue to move forward and upward in insight, it must (and it does) go beyond the warrant of evidence and affirm topside beliefs which are completed by faith. Even assuming the validity of our basic faiths, most structures of belief built thereon, in themselves and their warrants, fall far short of certainty. And though we do not hold them with absolute theoretical certainty, judging by our intensity of debate and our use of them as guides for further investigation and stepping-stones to further knowledge, we place faith in them far in excess of the evidence. Determinism is a case in point. It aids us in adding knowledge to knowledge even though, in principle, we can never prove absolutely that nature is thus determined and even though some doubt it.

That this topside, this post-reason, this crowning faith does attach itself to our thought and theories and that thought would be frustrated were this not so I trust will be quite readily acknowledged. This thesis, therefore, may be treated briefly. In what senses, then, does faith exceed the evidence and the strict conclusions supported by observation?

For one thing, our universalizing tendency in thinking far outruns the mere drop in the bucket which symbolizes the evidence at hand. As Poincaré says:

All experiment is long and difficult; the workers are few; and the number of facts that we need to foresee is immense. Compared with this mass the number of direct verifications that we can make will never be anything but a negligible quantity.²⁰

Yet we make declarations about the universe, with its billions of galaxies each with its billions of heavenly bodies. And we make these declarations on the basis of such data as are, by contrast, mere sparkling specks of star dust speeding by our blinking eyes. We affirm laws of the universe—as though we had tramped to its farthest shores and sailed its boundless seas—when we scarcely see but one step ahead.

Further than this, we have no way of knowing, even after most exacting scientific verification, that the hypothesis verified is the only hypothesis which coherently fits the facts. Actually, concerning the same data, science sometimes has held several theories simultaneously.²¹ In physics, in sharply divided camps, there are the determinists and "freedomists." In biology, there are mechanists and believers in purpose; each thinks his theory best explains the facts. In philosophy and religion, the same condition prevails: there are theistic absolutists and theistic finitists. Each appeals to reason. Each interprets the same facts. Each holds a different theory. The fact is that verification, at its best, *because of what we do not know*, gives far from absolute certainty.

It need not be elaborated but it ought to be mentioned, further, that even when held with the preciseness of confidence warranted by the limitations of knowing, all topside theories still depend greatly on faith. For they, too, rest on the inevitable, basic beliefs to which we have already referred.

Add to this the almost infinite variety of opinions held by thoughtful men. And add to that the inescapable fact that, even as we strive for coherence, each one of us must ultimately judge for himself what is coherent; he must test it in the court of his *own* thinking. And you have further grounds for caution in your praise of reason.

Finally, we trust our theories—and build

structures of similarly trusted theories one upon the other, each depending on the other, though our theories often walk with thorns or even sabers in their sides, painful facts which will not let our theory relax. A conspicuous example is any theory of religion, for all are hunted and haunted by the problem of evil. Earnest thinkers everywhere, from Brightman to Ferré, humbly confess that much, at best, remains obscure. Yet despite the broken edges of each theory, each puts his faith, and properly, in that which seems to him most reasonable. And for the disbeliever, of course, the cutting edge of the problem of the good is no less painful and disturbing.

As Professor Brightman confesses:

Every possible point of view that the mind can assume . . . is haunted by its own incompleteness—what Hegel calls "the seriousness of the negative."²²

Yet we hold and defend our theories and utilize them as stepping stones to further insight with a vigor quite exceeding the strength of our wounded, unhealed theoretical offspring.

Faith fills in and extends our structures of belief which go beyond the given data,²³ which are held in spite of the possibility of other equally warranted and differing theories, in spite of the probable nature of the pre-reason faiths on which all our theories rest, in spite of the infinite variety of views offered, in spite of the limitation which consists in the fact that we must ultimately test each claim in the "forum of the individual mind,"²⁴ and in spite of awkward facts which will not fit our theories.

Faith, then, is not only reason's feet. It is reason's crown. It is the slim but sturdy tendons that hold the parts together and the balm that soothes the organism's wounds. In so far as what has been said is sound, it follows that reason and all our knowledge are nourished and sustained, pervaded by faith as the circulatory system pervades and sustains the body. Reason lives by faith or it does not live at all.

III. FAITH GUIDED BY REASON

But something further must be added. If reason cannot say to faith, "I have no need

of thee," no more can faith say to reason, "I have no need of thee." Herein lies the illusion of Barth and the extremists of his school. The truth appears to be as Locke put it so long ago, that "he that takes away reason to make way for revelation (for uncriticized faith) puts out the light of both."²⁵

Reason is dependent on faith, to be sure. But that does not mean that reason gives no necessary and saving light. Any other instrument or test of truth, such as feeling, intuition, pragmatism and the like, rests on the same or comparable pre-reason faiths. No human mind, on any terms, can stand without such scaffolds. But even onto such scaffolding there crowd and will crowd blind, contradictory and arbitrary beliefs—ever more fallacious as the light of reason fades.

We suspect that one faith is not as good or at least as true as another. We suspect it only under the light of some rational principle or criterion of discrimination. This principle is *coherence*. It means that the mind accepts as true that theory which best embraces and interprets most consistently and interrelatedly the data of experience. For a rational Christian, for example, Jesus Christ is believed in and served because he most coherently and meaningfully illuminates this universe and the perplexing experience of human living. Like all theories, as a theory, the Christian faith has its broken edges and its thorns. But as the most coherent of all known theories, it is crowned, by the rational believer, with the faith which affirms that it is really true.

Reason, coherence, must be our criterion—not feeling, not intuition, not uncriticized revelation, not blind faith. For such principles not only must affirm that one faith or one revelation is as good as another, that as faiths or feelings or intuitions or revelations all are equally valid; but, because they are purely subjective and arbitrary, they close the path to any growth through objective, co-operative, critical inquiry. They provide no principle of criticism. They constitute no objective ideal to which all eyes and all minds, regardless of personal feelings, faiths or revelations, may turn and in the commonly ac-

knowledge light of which claims to truth may be critically examined. Reason in terms of coherence, on the other hand, despite its acknowledged limitations, has the advantage of being an objective ideal under the objective light of which investigation through coöperation may proceed and theories and truth claims may be objectively compared, criticized and refined.

But when it comes to religion, there are some who say that their choice of a faith is not dictated by reason. Or they go even farther and say that they choose not at all. God chooses them. God makes the truth unmistakably clear. Otherwise they could never see. There is no other way.

But if they really mean that they choose for no reason, exercise no rational judgment, one wonders why they choose, say, the Christian revelation as the true one. And at the same time one wonders why the Mohammedan's or Jew's choice is no less justified and his acknowledged revelation no less true—when he is guided by the same principle of nonrational faith; why his revelation, though differing, is not also the truth. But to understand how contradictory revelation claims can be equally true is difficult in the extreme.

Or if a man of faith escapes this problem by affirming that God chooses him, an equally difficult perplexity appears. If, without appeal to reason, the truth is made indisputably clear by God's own initiative only, why is it made clear only to some persons?

It is not enough to say that the New Testament, the Truth, is equally available to all. The same could be said of the Old Testament or the Koran. The point is that if reason is not our guide and if some nonrational principle is, then that nonrational principle or its author is betraying all devoted nonrational believers who are surrendered to the wrong revelations. And he is leaving all believers in reason and earnest pursuers of the light outside, though presumably it was he who planted reason in us and caused us both to trust it and in measure to prosper in it.

Is it not better to acknowledge that, in religion, as in all things, we should affirm

that faith which is most clearly guided and justified by the light of reason? And at the same time concede that revelation may offer what reason might never have discovered on its own but which it might confirm? And that religious faith is as fully justified as is science and philosophy in affirming absolutely, with practical certainty, the Reality toward which the light of reason points it, however so broken or incomplete the beams of light may be? For reason, "the broken arcs." By faith only—whether for science, philosophy or religion—by faith only, the "perfect round."

CONCLUSION

This, then, appears to be the conclusion of the matter:

Faith shoes, crowns, binds, heals and pervades all reason—in science, philosophy and religion.

So far as possible, reason ought always to pervade, determine, direct, warrant and clarify faith.

There is no question, then, as to whether we should worship at the shrine of faith or reason. Ideally, the two are ever interdependent in all believing.

The question rather is: *Which faith* will we hold and serve?

And the answer ought to be: The faith which seems *most reasonable*.

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2. *Ibid.*, 263.
3. *Ibid.*, 29.
4. Du Noüy, Lecomte, *Human Destiny*, Chapters One to Three.
5. Page 192.
6. Trueblood, David E., *The Logic of Belief*, p. 56; cf. Balfour, *Theism and Humanism*, p. 167.
7. *Theism and Humanism*, p. 168.
8. *Logic of Belief*, p. 57.
9. *The Realm of Matter*, p. 2.
10. *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, IV, 2.
11. *Theism and Humanism*, pp. 194–195.
12. Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, Chapter Five.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 104–106.
15. Reichenbach, *Atom and Cosmos*, p. 106.

(Continued on page 72)

Varied Resources for Religious Education

EDNA M. BAXTER*

TODAY there are large numbers of courses of study and other materials to aid the teacher of religion. A small number of them are excellent and deserve to be widely known and used. Among such is *Thy Kingdom Come* for high school students. It deals vividly with the social meaning of the Christian Faith, describing social pioneers and evaluating some of the approaches to such problems as poverty, racial conflict, alcoholism, leisure, and the home. A new course for junior high school groups, *Our Living Book*, is an interesting study of the Bible, and provides the teacher with good plans. Like much of the traditional teaching of the Bible, more than half the time is devoted to the prehistorical period and but two sessions to the prophets and postexilic material. However, there is much to commend in this course. It seems pertinent to recall some books by Ethel Cutler. In *One People Among Many* are interestingly presented some of the writers of Israel with vivid glimpses of the world of their time. Older young people's groups and private schools will enjoy this course. This can easily be followed by her other course, *One Prophet and Another*, which offers a rich experience in the study of the important prophets from Moses to Jesus. *They Told About Jesus*, is an unusual course which enables the student to know what many people once said and thought about Jesus while the church was growing. Here is a field of study that many laymen will appreciate. They will enjoy reading the quotations taken from early Christian sources. Older groups will be interested in a short but helpful course, *That Grotesque Last Book in the New Testament, Revelation*. The author has consulted able scholars and aims to answer the

questions, why, when, how, and by whom it was written and what its chief message is. *How To Enjoy Studying The Bible* is devoted to novel ways of reading the Bible, but it fails to make provision for the historical or scholarly background greatly needed by the average layman.

In The Morning is a charming book of pictures for young children illustrating the modern meaning of some twenty Bible verses. The miscellaneous choice of verses makes the content disconnected and therefore of lesser value as a child's book. *Once There Was a Little Boy* is an unusually attractive book for children between seven and ten, dealing with the way Jesus may have lived as a small child. The colored pictures by Helen Sewell greatly enrich the text. Homes and church schools will find much use for this book.

Pathways Through the Bible sets out to give the American Jews a simplified version of "The Holy Scriptures" which will be readable, easy to comprehend, and even enjoyable. The selections include those classic passages of the Old Testament which "combine both literary beauty and the enduring ethical and religious values of Judaism." The material is subdivided into units of thought, each with a suitable heading. The different books are introduced with an appropriate historical setting. Illustrations add meaning and beauty to this lovely volume.

Important events in history need to be located somewhat accurately in time and in order. This is not always accomplished in the teaching of history whether it be secular, church or biblical. *Pegs of History* is a picture book of world dates. It is valuable for junior high young people and also for those who teach it offers a valuable suggestion of an approach to the teaching of historical material.

Let Us Give Thanks is a useful file of

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cards containing suitable prayers and graces for the home. To this file should be added the lovely illustrated *Little Book of Singing Graces* adapted to the understanding of young children by Jeanette Perkins Brown. The format and pictures in the illustrated book of hymns, *Sing In Praise*, are gorgeous, yet it is a great disappointment to find that so many of the hymns are suitable only for older adults.

There is need for the religious educator to work constantly on varied problems in human relations. The times call for Christians to become actively involved in building appreciation and goodwill between varied racial, religious, and national groups. Fortunately there is a flood of superior materials to aid in such an educational enterprise. Since the virtues of love and goodwill are not taught very effectively through abstraction they must be learned through concreteness and through experiences of the right sort. The Friendship Press frequently provides valuable materials that will help the churches do this. Youth leaders will find valuable help in their unpretentious pamphlet, *Discussion and Program Suggestions for Youth on the Christian and Race*. Another interesting course for adolescent people is *Neighbors Half a World Away* written by Mrs. Hipps, who has spent many years in China. She provides a balanced picture of Chinese people together with interesting experiences for the students who learn about them. Homes and churches need more books like *Billy Bates* for their libraries. The inclusion of Negroes and Chinese boys and girls in children's relationships is here made normal and interesting. Presented in still more attractive format is *Two Is a Team*, telling the story of a Negro boy and a white boy playing together. The book is printed in large type and beautifully illustrated in full color by Mr. Crichlow, a distinguished Negro artist. In *Let's Get Together* there are stories and ideas about things for young people to do in matters of race relations. *Sense and Nonsense About Race* gives valuable material about race expertly prepared by Ethel Josephine Alpenfels,

an anthropologist. *Know-Then Act* gives interesting and practical guidance to youth on ways for them to improve race relations in America, while *Seeking To Be Christian In Race Relations*, deals effectively with the religious basis of the problem. For junior-high school pupils in the church, Mrs. Nall gives in *One World—One Family* a fascinating course concerned with race.

Two stimulating books on the Y.M.C.A. and the Christian Student Movement will interest those connected with these programs for young people. Dr. Limbert is abundantly qualified to offer the program suggestions given in his valuable book *Christian Emphasis in Y.M.C.A. Program*. At the college student level, Dr. Shedd has reviewed the thrilling story of the Christian Youth Movement in *A Century of Christian Student Initiative*.

New Day Ascending is a vivid, fascinating story of a prophet's missionary movement which began over a hundred years ago with the liberation of the Amisted slaves who mutinied off the coast of Cuba. A hundred years of spearheading for freedom and justice among Negroes, Southerners, Highlanders, Jamaicans, Hawaiians, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Puerto Ricans is reviewed with pictures and with documents. *How God Fix Jonah* taps a fresh source of genuine folklore from the spoken lore of Africa, the rhythmic cadences, polished by many tellings in the tribal circle. In this beautifully illustrated book tales of Ruth, Jonah, Job, David and other familiar characters reveal the range of interpretation of the modern West African. Mysteries are explained in terms of the tangible. The God as a reasonable man arguing with Satan over Job, and how he is affected by the argument not to "break the world that you done made."

Keeping religious education relevant to the lives of people here and now seems to be a major problem. The first volume of the Inter-Seminary Series, *The Challenge of Our Culture*, is so pertinent that the reviewer wishes to call attention to it lest some may not have read it. It is concerned with such questions as rivalries for power in this machine

age, with racism and color caste and secularism in the church reminding us that escapism into the past and preaching ideals unrelated to the specifics of life are but day dreaming. *Towards Christian Democracy*, a stimulating little book by Sir Stafford Cripps, Great Britain's President of the Board of Trade, deserves to be widely read and studied by laymen in the business world. This great liberal statesman declares that "If all the vast effort of the war had been consciously directed according to the moral concepts of our Christian religion, we should today be enjoying a happiness and prosperity unexampled in world history, instead of the misery, and suffering of the world's greatest and most brutal war." He believes that Jesus' teachings are "simple rules according to which we should live our lives here on earth."

A method of world reconstruction is discussed in *The Coöperative Way*, with a view to promoting democracy, social justice, economy of abundance, and international peace. The author believes that "a different attitude toward our fellowmen is called for. If the world is to be spared further chaos men must be treated as fellowmen." Since such a goal is involved in a Christian way of life, the volume should interest adult groups in the churches especially because of its descriptions of the coöperative movement around the world. *Coöperative Communities at Work* describes some of the varied kinds of coöperative communities in Palestine, Mexico and the Soviet Union as well as experiments of the Farm Security Administration. The author considers the advantages and the problems found in these pioneer efforts and then concludes, "There is no reason why postwar resettlement should not avail itself of various methods . . . the modern, realistic coöperative type has proved itself capable of attaining two important goals: the rehabilitation of the destitute farmer and the modernization of farming. It has also helped to raise the cultural standards of rural life."

Leaders in Education both in the Church and in the University will welcome this prac-

tical book, *When You Marry*. It offers a functional approach to the many questions involved in marriage and deals with them in an interesting yet scientific manner. There are four parts to the volume: Anticipating Marriage; The Making of a Family; Family Life Yesterday; Today and Tomorrow". Each of the twenty-one chapters begins with the questions that young people most frequently ask and is organized in the light of these concrete problems. Many churches may wish to use the book as a course of study with their young married people. It should achieve its stated purpose to give "the type of education which the majority of our people must have if they are to be good citizens, parents and workers." The home, church and community are seen inseparably bound together for the development of values inherent in each, according to the educational plan outlined in *The Modern Parent and The Teaching Church*. Much attention is given to definite processes for reaching adults, and fostering a dynamic fellowship. Out of his experience, Dr. Fallaw illustrates what the local church may do to enrich its educational program and intensify its work. The author says, "Our efforts at establishing effective religious guardians will hardly be successful so long as we merely pay our respects to the fundamental importance of the home as an educational agency, and then go our institutional ways without a genuine merging of home and church vision and ability."

Children Can See Life Whole is another book that should not be forgotten by religious educators. It is a study of progressive schools to discover the extent to which they aided in the intellectual and emotional development of young people. The author was interested in an education that enabled young folks to put life together and to see "things whole." The church needs to see people as wholes and this book can make a real contribution in the training of group and teaching leadership. *School's Out* explains why community planning for the child between five and twelve whose parents work is needed. It offers practical suggestions for the organization of play centers,

describes actual play schools, and discusses the importance of play and the training of leadership for such schools. Church leaders will recognize the sound suggestions for their own part in contributing to the needs of children in their own neighborhoods. "If children are permitted to make full use of play in all its aspects it can be an invaluable therapeutic agent. In a world where adults so often offer too little security many children are able to solve their own problems when given an opportunity for play, though some others require psychiatric assistance. Emotions cannot be ignored, stifled, or allowed to destroy the child."

Let's Talk About You helps adolescent girls face their own problems. Mrs. Bro tries to answer many of the questions girls are asking such as: how they look, how to get along with people, what to talk about, what to do about a vacation and a job, and questions about marriage. In more recent developments "in man's long effort to understand himself is the systematic study of the individual society and culture." *The Cultural Background of Personality* by Ralph Linton deals with the meeting point of psychology, sociology and anthropology, revealing how the collaboration of specialists in these fields is resulting in a new science devoted to the dynamics of human behavior. The author of *Adolescence and Youth* says, "In the study of adolescence there has been too much emphasis on the physiological, too little on the social and psychological; too little understanding that experience is more than a function of physical maturation and inherent disposition too little understanding of the impingement of the social procession on the developing organism; too much emphasis upon adolescence and youth as a state, a period; too little upon it as a dynamic process which leads the growing organism through a molding series of social experiences." His book considers these emphases effectively in the social world of youth in the urban, the town, and rural community.

The plays and the bibliography alone make *Conscience on Stage* an invaluable resource for

churches and Christian Student groups. Many will wish to use the "Christmas Service of Worship" by Robert Scott Steele found in the Appendix. Teachers will be helped by *Teaching With Films* in the mechanical aspect of the use and care of films and projectors. The brief chapter on making films is suggestive. Many directors of religious education will welcome *A Guide To Christian Education*, a fairly discriminating source of information on much of the best material in religious education for all ages and for varied purposes. *The Church Nursery Roll* and *Four and Five Year Olds* give much practical help to teachers and leaders concerned with the religious education of young children. If the Christian Church would take its responsibilities as seriously as the dictators in their kind of education, there seems little doubt that considerable change could be made in the world picture. Growing out of his rich experience Frank Lindhorst has provided ministers and other educators with significant material for religious education in *The Minister Teaches Religion*. *Successful Letters For Churches* contains a large variety of letters used for many types of situations. *Margie* is the story of a girl's friendship as revealed in her letters.

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Research Abstracts

RESEARCH IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS (1946)

CHARLES S. BRADEN*

The relative paucity of research articles in the field of the History of Religion is rather noticeable in comparison with the list of articles abstracted in the field of Old Testament by Dr. Pfeiffer in the July issue. This, no doubt, is a reflection of the fact that by far the greatest number of scholars in the field of religion still concern themselves with Bible and related subjects.

It is also a partial reflection of the fact that a number of articles which have appeared dealing with the subject were published in foreign periodicals to which the author either did not have access, or considered that because of their inaccessibility to any but those most favored in respect to library resources, it was hardly worthwhile to include them. For a fairly complete coverage of periodical material dealing not only with this area but the whole field of religion, though only the titles of articles are given, see the regular section "Among the Periodicals" published in the *Review of Religion* (Columbia University Press). Here are included not only research articles, but general articles which could hardly be so classed. Nevertheless, these have genuine value for the teacher and student of the History of Religion, for many of them are by members of the non-Christian faiths, and are very helpful in getting the inside point of view of those faiths. A few such articles

have been abstracted here and will be included in future abstract articles.

With the exception of three articles published in this Journal in April 1947, all abstracts are of articles appearing in 1946.

1. Buddhism

Kenneth K. S. Ch'en, "The Tibetan Tripitaka" (*Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 9, pp. 53-62). From the 8th century the work of translation of the Sanskrit texts into Tibetan was carried on by 350 or more scholars until over 4,000 items had been put into Tibetan. The first edition, the Snar-than, old edition, was first *printed* from wooden blocks in the 13th century. Subsequent editions are noted and dated, and the article concludes with a table showing the present distribution of various editions of the canon.

I. B. Horner, "Gotama and the Other Sects", (*Journal American Oriental Society*, Vol. 66, pp. 283-289). Taking as his basis a selection of views held by other and heretical sects brought to the Buddha's notice, according to the record of the Palicanon, the article draws attention to what Gotama held to be "right views", thus exhibiting his attitude to some of the current problems of his day "as these were created by the great spiritual striving that was going on in the country all around" and by "the moral unrest caused by the reaction to the conservative ethics of the Upanishads".

2. Chinese Religions

Homer H. Dubs, "Han Yü and the Buddha's Relic: An Episode in Medieval Chinese Religion". (*Review of Religion*, Vol. 11, pp. 5-17). A translation from the Chinese of a memorial

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concerning a Relic of Buddha by one Han Yü, a courtier, who, as a Confucian, felt himself obliged to oppose the introduction of a Buddhist relic into the imperial palace, though knowing full well that it might cost him his life. Condemned to death his sentence was commuted to exile as an official to a distant point, but after the early death of the emperor he returned in honor to the court. The memorial sets forth that Buddhism does not lengthen life or benefit a government; that the dynastic policy was to repress Buddhism; the dangerous social consequences of the imperial order; that Buddhism is un-Chinese and immoral; and, finally, that the author takes upon himself any untoward results of his proposal.

Homer H. Dubs, "The Political Career of Confucius". (*Journal American Oriental Society*, Vol. 66, pp. 273-282). The author, believing that legend has obscured the really remarkable achievements of Confucius in his brief political career at Lu, finds the key to that career in the circumstances leading to his departure from Lu, namely the dismantling of the Lu city-castles which he secured by a notable diplomatic victory, or what the author calls the "cleverest trick that has been played in many a year". This he thinks accounts not only for his departure and his forced exile, but also for the unwillingness of any ruler to employ him in his service.

Earl Cressy, "Recent Developments in the Religions of China", (*Journal of Bible and Religion*, Vol. XV, pp. 75-80, April 1947). Setting aside the traditional "three religions of China" for five, including Islam and Christianity, the author gives what he thinks to be the trends within each, and in Christianity considers Catholicism and Protestantism separately. Besides this, he enumerates several of the trends felt within the various religions and outside them, among them a feeling of the need of religion, and a tendency toward coöperation among the different faiths in certain common interests.

3. Greek Religion

D. W. Gundry, "The Religion of a Greek

Gentleman in the First Century A. D." (*Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 44, pp. 245-52). The gentleman is Plutarch, "a typical cultured citizen of the Graeco-Roman world of the first century", and his religion is found expressed chiefly in his *Moralia* and *Roman and Greek Questions*. Plutarch was an associate of the College of Priests at Delphi and a member of the committee which superintended the Pythian Games.

Hans Lewy, "A Latin Hymn to the Creator Ascribed to Plato", (*Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 39: 243-58). A study of a Latin hymn attributed to Plato, translated from the Greek, probably coming from the second century A.D. Tiberianus, the translator, it is conjectured, found the original of the hymn in Porphyry's *Philosophy of the Oracles*.

Herbert Jennings Rose, "Theology and Mythology in Aeschylus". (*Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 39, pp. 1-24). Aeschylus was not only a poet but a theologian. In his plays are found passages both theological and mythological. The author considers characteristic passages from his plays, asking "which of them may be thought to be Aeschylus' own theological views and which were tellings of traditional stories with some touch of criticism from himself on one of the actors".

4. Religions of India

Ananda Coomaraswamy, "Rig Veda 10.90, *aty atishad dasangulam*." (*Journal American Oriental Society*, Vol. 66, pp. 145-61). A highly detailed study of one phrase in the hymn to Purusha which the author concludes "means that the Purusha making the whole earth his footstool, fills the entire universe, and rules over it by means of the powers of vision, etc., that proceed from his face and to which man's own powers of vision, etc. are analogous . . .", "... that *dasangulam* is really a designation of the face of God . . . and that his face is not in any exclusive sense an Indian doctrine, . . . but found almost everywhere".

Davis, George W., "Some Hidden Effects of Christianity upon Hinduism and Hindus". (*Journal of Religion*, Vol. 26, pp. 111-124).

Finds the measure of the effectiveness of Christian Missions in India not in statistics of membership but in moral and spiritual revolution in India, particularly in an increasing monotheistic belief in God; the penetration of Hindu society by Christian ethical standards; the adaptation of such Christian techniques as congregational worship; the development of a missionary passion, and, finally, in the penetration of Hindu society by Christ.

Malcolm Pitt, "Recent Developments in Religion in India". (*Journal of Bible and Religion*, Vol. XV, pp. 69-74, April 1947). A brief survey of the trends observable in present day Hinduism, particularly as touching politics and religion; society and religion; and philosophy and religion. An excellent statement of the respective positions of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, the Sikhs and the Untouchables, and of the essential characteristics of the Neo-Hinduism which is resulting from the Hindu Renaissance.

S. V. Viswanatha, "Some Vedic Texts on Reincarnation". (*Prabuddha Bharata*, Vol. 51, pp. 320-22). A very brief article opposed to the view that the idea of reincarnation came into Hinduism from indigenous, non-Aryan sources. Cites a few Vedic texts which, he holds, prove that the "Aryans were acquainted with some of the elementary ideas of metempsychosis".

5. Islam

Charles C. Adams, "Abu Hanifah, Champion of Liberalism and Tolerance in Islam", (*Moslem World*, Vol. 36, pp. 217-27). Not strictly a research article but a review article concerning a volume published in Arabic by Abdal-Halim al Jindi (*Abu Hanifah Batal al-Hurriya wal-Tasa muh fi 'l-Islam*, Cairo, 1945) in which is given a lengthy abstract of the book. Abu Hanifa was founder of one of the four orthodox schools of Islamic law.

Dwight M. Donaldson, "Aphorisms in Islamic Ethics", (*Moslem World*, Vol. 36, pp. 240-251). Discusses the place of aphorisms in setting forth Islamic teachings, particularly on ethical practice. Out of a variety of col-

lections of such sayings, both Sunnite and Shiite, numerous illustrations are given of words, sayings or reported speeches of the prophet, or Ali, or their companions.

John N. Hollister, "The Shiite Community in India Today", (*Moslem World*, Vol. 36, pp. 319-330). A study of the number and the geographical location of the Shiite Moslems, their political and social organizations, their relation to the Sufis and Sunnis, their shrines, holidays, laws and customs, with a concluding note on the future of Indian Shiism.

S. M. Imamuddin, "The Geographical Influence on the Early Expansion of the Islamic State". (*The Calcutta Review*, Vol. 99, pp. 21-24, April 1946). The rapid early expansion of the Islamic state was due in no small degree to the barrenness of Arabia and the desire of the desert Arabs for better economic conditions. Old empires were defeated because "The Arabs had the new spirit of Islam engraved on their hearts, and further, because they had not sufficient livelihood at home but had prospects of booty in the wars".

Pinchas Wechter, "Parables and Comparisons in the Koran". (*Crozer Quarterly*, Vol. 23, pp. 325-339.) Mohammed like the prophets and Jesus made much use of figurative speech and stories. This article gathers out of the Koran a considerable number of such, classified as to subject. Easy comparison with Biblical figures and parables thus is made possible.

Franz Rosenthal, "On Suicide in Islam". (*Journal American Oriental Society*, Vol. 66, pp. 239-259). A detailed examination of the passages in the Koran and the Hadith which deal with suicide; a collection from theological opinions found in other Islamic literature; and finally a long chronological list of Moslem suicides from 644 to 1488, form a rather exhaustive study of the subject of suicide in Islam.

Wm. W. Watt, "Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam". (*Moslem World*, Vol. 36, pp. 124-152). As in Christianity, there has been in Islam a sustained conflict between those who believe in free will and in predestina-

tion. On the basis of a consideration of passages in the Koran and the Traditions, followed by a discussion of the views of rival schools of Islamic thought, the author concludes that there was a strong strain of fatalism in pre-Mohammedan Arabia which Mohammed did not so much try to eradicate as "to convince men that they were ultimately dependent upon a living and righteous God who on the last day would judge them according to their works." However, the old ideas survived and found expression in the Traditions, and "gradually, fatalistic practices, explicitly condemned in the Koran received approval".

S. M. Zwemer, "Atonement by Blood Sacrifice in Islam". (*Moslem World*, Vol. 36, pp. 189-192). A brief discussion of the two main occasions for blood sacrifice, at the birth of a child, the sacrament of initiation, and the great annual Feast of Sacrifice celebrated at Mecca and throughout the world of Islam, commemorative of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son. Yet, both, particularly the latter, "have features and prayers which seem both expiatory and vicarious". It is compared both to Yom Kippur of Judaism and the Sacrifice of Christ in Christianity.

6. Japanese Religion

Charles W. Iglehart, "Current Religious Trends in Japan" (*Journal of Bible and Religion*, Vol. XV, pp. 81-85, April, 1947). Naturally, the most obvious religious trends have occurred within Shintoism as a result of the defeat of Japan and the Emperor's disclaimer of any divine status. These trends are clearly presented by the author who, however, goes on

to note also the effect of the recent war years upon Buddhism and Christianity. Dr. Iglehart writes out of a long and intimate acquaintance with Japan, where he lived and worked for almost thirty years, and a recent visit during which he was able to observe the present situation.

Morris E. Opler and Robert Seido Hashima, "The Rice Goddess and the Fox in Japanese Religion and Folk Practice," (*The American Anthropologist*, Vol. 48, pp. 43-53). While employed as Community Analyst in the Manzanar Relocation center in 1943, Mr. Opler had the opportunity of gathering from Japanese of the first and second generations in America, all of whom had lived in Japan for some length of time, material relating to the rice goddess Inari and the relation of the fox to her in the folk religion and practice. The materials were checked by individuals and in group discussions.

7. Primitive

R. F. Barton, "The Religion of the Ifugaos". (*The American Anthropologist*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Part 2, also listed as No. 65 in the Memoir Series of the American Anthropological Assn.) A 219-page monograph describing in great detail the religion of the Ifugaos, a Filipino tribe of some 70,000 members found on northern Luzon. The work is the result of field work done during three different periods of study among them. A second volume is projected. Unfortunately, all the field notes and several manuscripts of book size dealing with the subject were lost during the Japanese invasion.

Book Reviews

Christian Ethics

The Philosophy of War and Peace. By ALBERT C. KNUDSON. New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947. 221 pages. \$2.00.

Even to one whose professional duty it is to read quantities of material about "war and peace," this book constitutes an interesting and useful review of the subjects with which it deals, such as *The Apologetic For War*; *Modern Causes Of War*; *Growth Of The Argument For World Peace*, and various efforts toward the achievement of world peace in the past and today. As a source of valuable information and a statement of Dr. Knudson's philosophy of war and peace it can be heartily commended.

Moreover, Dr. Knudson's prescription of how peace may be attained is the one which is probably held by the great majority of well-intentioned Americans, in and out of the churches, and will commend itself to them as "eminently sensible." Briefly, it is that a world federal organization must be set up, having limited powers, but above all with military force enough to restrain and if necessary battle aggressors. Of course, ultimately the foundation of community is ethical and spiritual. The author ends his book indeed with the prophetic text: "Not by might, nor by power, but by my spirit, saith the Lord." It follows that "the peace *now being imposed by force* must also be or become a peace of justice. . ." (Italics mine.) But "the fatal defect" of the League of Nations "was its military weakness." Thus "the emphasis must fall on superior might. This is at times the only language the enemies of peace can understand."

Dr. Knudson does not seem to suspect that he may be dealing in platitudes and contradictions, or that at the least he is dealing with factors which he fails to integrate in such a way

as to be relevant to the actual situation in the world today.

To cite one or two specific cases, Dr. Knudson is strongly opposed to general disarmament. What he wants is limitation and control of armaments. Such limitation, he suggests, has "the double purpose of lessening the peril of war and the cost of preparation for it!" Which reminded me of the General who said it was America's duty both to prevent the next war and to win it. But the author pays no attention to the obviously crucial question as to where an international authority is to get adequate and reliable armed forces to restrain a powerful aggressor—and obviously forces adequate only to restrain some little fellow do not meet the need—if the potential aggressors are still also armed. What does "limitation" realistically mean here?

Dr. Knudson decisively rejects the idea that the international authority should have power simply to deal with individuals in all nations as the Federal police in this country deal with individuals in any state, and insists there must also be international military force to threaten or make war against recalcitrant states. He seems to be unaware of the fact that the Founding Fathers in the Constitutional Convention debated this issue at length and agreed that the idea of "policing" states by "armed force" is fantastic. Any effort to do so will be regarded as an act of war by the alleged offender. The author seems also to be unaware of the fact that none of the democratic federal unions in the world—and there are some notable ones, such as the British Commonwealth and Switzerland, in addition to our own—depend on armies in the hands of the federal power to keep "aggressors" within the union in line. Is it common sense to suppose that what Britain could not accomplish in the case of Ireland, let us say, the U. N. will be

able to do with a recalcitrant Russia or United States?

Practically all peace advocates, including pacifists, believe a world authority or government is necessary. All questions of the character of that authority and the nature of the sanctions it can command are as a matter of fact at this moment of minor significance compared to the burning question, how any real step toward any kind of world-organization and peace is going to be taken. In this connection Dr. Knudson is positive that "security" must be created first, then "disarmament" may follow. He does not grapple with the fact that, accepting his prescription, the governments of the United States and Russia are now engaged in an atomic armaments race. Naturally, each must look after its own "security" in this way until another kind or organ of "security" has been set up. But how are two nations thus engaged in an armaments race, i.e. a "hidden" war, going to set up an international organization while they are engaged in war? Recall Dr. Einstein's recent warning: "The making of peace is a psychological problem. But you have this dilemma: you want to prepare for peace and you want to prepare for war. You cannot serve these two masters. You cannot prepare for war and for peace at the same time."

How is the world going to extricate itself from this dilemma? I doubt whether Dr. Knudson who asserts unequivocally, as do most of his fellow citizens and fellow ministers, that "self-defense is a privilege and a duty which no self-respecting nation would forego," has the answer to this fateful question. For myself, I cannot put from my mind the idea that there is a higher law—something about "he that would save his life shall lose it"—on which some nation may have to act; that at any rate there are churches which have somehow an obligation to proclaim that law.

The nation is staking its existence as it is now on atomic war and preparation for it. Even from the "eminently sensible" point of view it might perhaps just as well stake it on total renunciation of war and war-preparation.

Furthermore, it is probable that what men deem sensible, i.e. not very radical or costly, is not enough any more, that they will actually have to try something a little mad, some "foolishness of God." Is it reasonable to expect that history and God will let us off unless in the social and political realm we find and use something comparable to the release of atomic energy in the physical realm?

A. J. MUSTE

The Fellowship of Reconciliation

Christian Ethics and Social Policy. By JOHN C. BENNETT. New York Scribner's, 1947. ix + 132 pages. \$2.00.

A sensitive weighing of alternatives, an acute sense of the difficulties human beings confront as they seek the good in complex social situations, and a resolute determination to keep the real and the ideal interacting with each other in the interpretation of the Christian ideal mark this outstanding essay in Christian Ethics.

In these Richard Lectures in the University of Virginia, Professor Bennett orients himself to four other conceptions of Christian strategy which fail, he believes, either because they identify Christian ethics with particular forms of social organization, or because they allow the individual or group to withdraw from personal responsibility for social salvation. Any attempt to absolutize some pattern of social means to Christian ends as *the* Christian solution overlooks both the sinfulness of man and the difficulties which equally sincere Christians do find in evaluating technical problems regarding the suitability of the means to ends agreed upon. On the other hand, "It is fatal to allow the standards by which the institutions of society are to be judged and the standards which the Christian acknowledges for his own life to fly apart" (p. 57).

Professor Bennett states that his "*fifth strategy is one that emphasizes the relevance together with the transcendence of the Christian ethic and which takes account of the universality and persistence of sin and the elements of*

technical autonomy in social policies." This principle is implemented by five subsidiary guiding principles and is elucidated by discussion of contemporary social issues and with special reference to "The Ethical Role of the Church in Society", the last chapter. The book ends with a "Note on Christian Ethics and the Ethics of Natural Law" which strikes this reviewer as superior even to the excellent standard of the rest of the book.

What troubles this reader especially in the strategy suggested by Professor Bennett is the fact that while insistence on the transcendence of Christian principles keeps them pure and unstained from attempts to identify them with particular social systems, their relevance to the concrete affairs of men is seriously endangered. Professor Bennett would keep a tense balance between transcendence and relevance, but is this really possible? The individual Christian on this view can never be sure that *any* of the means man can discover in any complex social situation will be assuredly Christian, even though he is sure of Christian principles involved. But is there any meaning for a Christian principle at all obligatory for man in his situation unless it be seen in terms of that situation? To think of Christian principles abstractly held before God's mind as a model for condemning *every* concrete human endeavor does not seem to be the proper analogy. Better to think of God laboring with man in every situation to do the best possible in that situation; better to see the full meaning of the principle developing in the enacting of the best possible means in each situation; better to see the best possible means as *the Christian in that situation!* Even these inadequate queries indicate that there are basic issues lurking nearby which this provocative book will help each attentive reader to face again.

PETER A. BERTOCCHI

Boston University

Render Unto the People. By UMPHREY LEE. New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947. 164 pages. \$1.50.

For those who have supposed that only fascism and communism are threats to the Christian faith of Americans, this book is an eye-opener. It considers the dangers to religion in a state ruled by majority vote. The current tendency to believe that the will of the majority should not be thwarted carries large implications for education and religion (pp. 17, 15, 20.)

Majority vote has come to set moral and religious standards without its being noticed that mere numbers of voters do not insure qualified judgments on these matters. The observations of this busy university president are seasoned with penetrating scholarship and orientated in wide experience. Standing in close relation to the cultural currents of the day, Dr. Lee sees the chief problem of this generation to be not merely the preservation of the right to majority rule, but also that of obtaining the right kind of majority. A pagan majority can leave the dollar mark as its sign of ethical accomplishment and the pride of race and nation as its claim to immortality just as well as a dictatorship (cf. pp. 161-162.)

With governmental regulation affecting almost every phase of man's economic life, his education, health, recreation, communication, and other areas where character is formed, the unwisdom of controlling man's life in these vital issues begins to appear. Since so many clubs, educational and social organizations, newspapers, radios and motion pictures are "without religious interest" the result is that "the country is becoming secular with almost geometrical proportions" (p. 52.)

While the separation of church and state, assumed by many to be inherent in American government, had not actually taken place by the turn of the century, it is now rapidly occurring because of the diversity of religious groups. The state cannot coerce any group to worship contrary to its own conscience. On the other hand, independent religious groups cannot and must not try to force the state to adopt their own ideals (p. 138). The church nevertheless is likely to be left more and more at a disadvantage in training its children.

Dr. Lee's recommendations for stemming this tide of secularism are noteworthy. First, "the people" must see to it that their state does not control all of higher education. Second, they must insist on maintaining local control of schools to counteract the tendency toward centralized authority. Third, education must provide at all levels a large concern for values so that among them religion may find a healthy place. Fourth, all scholars should be made aware of the significance of religion in human affairs, and teachers of religion must acquire a grasp of its relevance to present problems. Finally, the church must serve as an agency of community for "men cannot live without community" (p. 158.) In a time of divisions and uprootings the supreme agency for holding men together is the anchorage generated by the church. Democracy can be trusted only when there is success in making men feel at home in the world and loyal to each other. With all its divisions the church can still accomplish these tasks.

Here is a wholesome antidote to the common reliance on the third-person-plural view of history. It is not "they" who are making the record of our time, but rather "we the people." It is absolutely essential to see what "we" are doing. Many Protestants will, however, put down the book in disappointment that President Lee has not told us more about how Protestantism can remain true to its tenets and not be rewarded merely by the spectacle of Catholicism gaining a larger and larger voice in the majority.

LOUIS WILLIAM NORRIS

DePaul University

Neoplatonism and the Ethics of St. Augustine. Vol. I. *Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine.* By BRUNO SWITALSKI. New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1946. xxxii + 113 pages. \$3.95. Bruno Switalski, a Polish scholar now in Canada, here presents the first of two studies on the influence of Neoplatonism on August-

tine's ethics. This volume deals with Plotinus, while the second will consider Porphyry. *Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine* is the author's own translation and revision of a work originally published in 1938 at Warsaw University in Poland. The English is, on the whole, excellent although the use of "Ethics" as a plural throughout the book will distress most readers. Further editorial revisions are needed, particularly in the bibliographical section where entries are inconsistent and incomplete. The excessively detailed footnotes need pruning.

After an exhaustive bibliography of works by and about Plotinus, Dr. Switalski outlines the main features of the ethics of Plotinus and of Augustine. He then analyzes the dependence of Augustine upon Plotinus and particularly upon the *Enneads*, which Augustine read in the midst of his struggle for faith. In them he found a solution to the problems of materialism and of evil which appealed both to his intellect and his will. Our author is careful—perhaps too careful—to prove that Augustine accepted from paganism only those truths which were "not opposed to the doctrine of the Church." Switalski concludes that Augustine was no syncretist, creating an eclectic system, but a loyal follower of the Church whose infallible authority was for him the criterion of truth (p. 109). Yet he does admit, as do the best scholars, that "St. Augustine was not strictly orthodox in every respect" in his moral philosophy.

Switalski's interpretation of Plotinus suggests to the reviewer a subject for some future Ph.D. thesis, namely, the relation of modern neo-orthodox theology to Plotinus. If, as Switalski says, "Plotinus created a new element to which he attached the greatest importance, namely that which exists beyond intellect . . . and is inaccessible to reason" (p. 22), then he is talking a language very close to that of some modern thinkers who despair of reason.

JANNETTE E. NEWHALL

Andover-Harvard Theological Library

Judaism

Outlines of Judaism. By SAMUEL PRICE.
New York: Bloch Publishing Company,
1946. xiii + 222 pages. \$2.75.

Rabbi Price has taught confirmation classes for over thirty years as a part of his ministry to the Conservative Synagogue Beth El in Springfield, Mass. He is singularly free from partisanship and the reader is soon pleased to discover that this manual, which grew out of his confirmation lectures, deals with the key principles and practices of Judaism in general.

Rabbi Price presents the creed of Judaism as made up of five principles of faith: belief in God, belief in revelation on Mount Sinai, belief in reward and punishment, belief in immortality of the soul and belief in the coming of the Messianic era. The rabbi's discussion of the fifth principle offers an excellent example of his catholicity. He explains that the Orthodox Jews believe in the coming of a personal Messiah while the Reform Jews look forward to a Messianic era. He concludes: "But whether we believe in a personal *Goel* or in a series of events that will bring about a *Geulah*, one thing is certain, and that is that the Jewish people persist in their hope for the coming of an ideal age when Israel and all humanity will enjoy the blessings of justice and peace."

The second part of the book deals with the laws and observances of Judaism. Most of this part is given over to an informative discussion of the festivals and fasts. In addition there are sections on prayer, the Synagogue and the Jewish home.

Part three sets forth the ethical teachings of Judaism. The tone of this part is exemplified by the section which explains what Judaism demands by way of helpfulness to one's fellow men. One is obliged to help the poor as a matter of justice, to support character building agencies, to visit the sick, to assist at the last rites of the dead, to comfort the mourners, to be a peacemaker and to think charitably of others. The next part which explains the customs and symbols of Judaism is encyclo-

pedic in character. Brief definitions are given of terms descriptive of a great variety of objects and practices connected with Judaism. The final part discusses the sources under three heads: the Bible, the Talmud and the codes of Jewish laws. Rabbi Price's brief but acute discussion of the character of the book of Daniel represents a high quality of Biblical scholarship. However, in this case the traditional Jewish view is relatively compatible with the critical approach. In most other instances in which there is conflict between tradition and the critical approach his tendency is to lean toward the former. This mediating position which is so apparent throughout the book is particularly characteristic of Conservative Judaism.

EUGENE S. TANNER

University of Tulsa

The Bible

The Rediscovery of the Old Testament. By H. H. ROWLEY. Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1946. \$3.00.

The author of this volume, in the opening chapter, gives as the essential standpoint of his study, "a return to religious values" in the light of the literary, historical, and archaeological investigations of modern days. This standpoint he maintains consistently throughout, although it seems to the reviewer that the title, "Rediscovery," is too strong. The value of the book lies primarily in its synthesis. The author is at home in the problems, methods, and results of Old Testament criticism. He is liberal and progressive, but by no means radical. He is familiar with the major findings of archaeology and senses clearly the light they throw upon the historical, cultural, and religious background of the Old Testament. The two archaeological chapters are an excellent popular summary. Bible students will welcome especially the brief discussions of the important Ras Shamra texts and the Lachish letters.

The author is also at home in the religious development of the Old Testament, and more especially with its theology. Keen is his interest also in New Testament theology and one of the finest features of his work is a constant sense of intimate relationship between the New Testament and the Old Testament. He is quite daring in dealing with central aspects of New Testament theology as well as with those of the Old Testament. At times, as in his treatment of the relation between the Jewish Passover and the Lord's Supper, his discussion seems needlessly involved and is unconvincing. Yet the view that we must understand a doctrine in its issue as well as through its genesis is argued and illustrated with convincing exposition. The figure of speech he employs, the source of which he had forgotten, wherein Old Testament prophecies are viewed as running to Christ as tidal rivers to the sea, and accordingly feel upon them his reflex, is a most suggestive one. It comes from Dr. George Adam Smith in his interpretation of messianic prophecy.

Dr. Rowley wisely maintains that we need "both a historical and a teleological understanding" of an Old Testament idea. He does not shrink at all from the use of terms which are usually associated with dogmatic theology such as the doctrine of the election of Israel. But in his hands the doctrine, historically treated, becomes that of Israel's election for service and so he makes this idea central in his conception of "the meaning of history."

In his chapter on "Monotheism" he attempts a synthesis of Biblical with extra-biblical material as it relates to Moses and the exodus. This reviewer keenly anticipated his discussion at this point, because of the detailed investigations Dr. Rowley had elsewhere published on these problems. The author places Joseph in the reign of Ikhnaton whose "second court" was maintained in Heliopolis, "near enough to the land of Goshen to satisfy bibli-

cal conditions." It was Rameses II who set the Israelites to work upon the city Avaris-Tanis, which he re-named Pi-Ramesse. During his reign Moses fled from Egypt and under the reign of Rameses' successor Merneptah, Moses returned to Egypt and led his people out. The present reviewer believes that Dr. Rowley has not made his case. He is convinced that (1) Vincent's date for the fall of Jericho (c. 1250 B.C.), (2) the date of the first extra-biblical mention of the people Israel in Merneptah's inscription (c. 1235 B.C.), together with (3) the archaeologically dated fall of Lachish (c. 1230 B.C.), point to the exodus under Moses as having taken place c. 1290 B.C., and the conquest under Joshua as having begun c. 1250 B.C., both during the reign of Rameses II. This chapter seems to the reviewer stronger historically than from the angle of its subject, "The Growth of Monotheism."

Dr. Rowley's discussion of Judaism is excellent. He shows the positive values of Judaism from the angle of religion and he corrects the frequently found appreciation of the contribution of the pre-exilic prophetic religion to the depreciation of priestly Judaism. He shows clearly the "deep sensitiveness of spirit" in the best expression of Judaism. He sets in striking relief the fact that it was postexilic Judaism that assembled and canonized the prophetic literature of the Old Testament, and he demonstrates most effectively the richness and depth of Judaism in its contribution to worship, both in religious ideas and in rituals.

One of the strongest chapters is "The Goal of History," in which in fine sensitiveness to religious teaching he deals with the abiding message of apocalyptic literature. He shows how the three great concepts, Messiah, Son of Man, and Suffering Servant come to a synthesis in Jesus.

ELMER A. LESLIE

Boston University

The Gospel of Jesus Christ. By PÈRE M.-J. LAGRANGE, O.P. Translated by members of the English Dominican Province. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Bookshop. Two volumes, 320 and 350 pages respectively. \$7.50.

Père Lagrange was a great biblical scholar connected, for many years, with the École Biblique of the Dominicans in Jerusalem. This work was completed toward the end of his life, the date of the author's preface being May, 1928. It thus represents the fruits of a long lifetime of study, teaching, and reflection, although for technical details the reader of the book is constantly referred to the author's commentaries. The English translation was first made available in 1938.

Long years of residence in Palestine and association with other great scholars on the staff of the Biblical School gave Père Lagrange an intimate acquaintance with Palestinian geography, archaeology, and anthropology

and this adds much to the sense of vivid reality to be found in the book.

The viewpoint differs, of course, from that of liberal Protestant scholarship at a number of points. The fourth gospel is treated as of equal historical value with the first three. The result of this "harmonizing" method is to give preponderant emphasis to the Gospel of John. Then, too, one fails to find any trace of the more sympathetic understanding of the Pharisees revealed in the writings of liberal Protestant scholars in recent decades. There is no hesitation in blaming "the Jews" (a Johannine phrase constantly used) for the death of Jesus, without any shading of responsibility among the various groups of Jewish religious life. Moreover, "Israel . . . refused ever to acknowledge her error in putting Jesus to death" (Vol. II, p. 141).

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the divinity of Jesus, or to use the language of the second main heading in this section, that "Jesus (is) the Son of God, God like His Father". This section is written with such feeling that one might call it the author's *Confessio Fidei*.

Reading this book will give Protestants a better understanding of the Catholic view of Jesus.

CARL E. PURINTON

Boston University

The Challenge of New Testament Ethics. By L. H. MARSHALL. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. xi + 363 pages. \$4.50.

L. H. Marshall, formerly at McMaster University (Canada) and now a Tutor in New Testament at Rawdon College (England), has written a fascinating book on the ethics of the New Testament. His scholarship is sound, his style of writing is intriguing, and the chapters are filled with literary alliterations which make the book very readable. 214 non-biblical writers are found in the index: Wilberforce and Wordsworth, Bernard Shaw and Strack-Billerbeck, John Milton and James Moffatt, C. E. Joad and William James, Aristotle and Matthew Arnold are a few of the many writers quoted who make this book vivid and alive. This book can well be used for an academic study of New Testament ethics, but it will equally provide a book for the general reader interested in religion. It is a book not easy to put aside after it is once begun.

Six chapters relate themselves directly to Jesus: *The Nature of the Ethics of Jesus*, *Jesus' View of Evil*, *Jesus' View of Good*, *The Chief Moral Imperatives of Jesus*, *Jesus and Society*, *The Validity of the Ethics of Jesus*. Four chapters are concerned with Paul: *Paul's Ethical Terminology*, *Paul as an Ethical Teacher*, *The Ethical Approach to Pauline Thought*, *The Ethics of Social Relations*. A final chapter deals with *The Ethical Approach to Theology*. Each chapter is carefully outlined with its main topics and sub-

topics, so that the reader finds no difficulty in following the scope of the entire book. The writer approaches his New Testament concepts as both historian and theologian: the ethical ideas are seen in their native setting, but are also viewed in the light of contemporary living. While the book is objectively written with the help of the tools of research, the tone of the volume has a devotional touch. Throughout the volume Greek words occur, but always accompanied by an English translation.

Three chapters in particular appealed to me. From each of these chapters a few passages will give a key understanding of the writer's viewpoint. (1) *The Nature of the Ethics of Jesus*: "For three centuries the Pagan world was unconscious of the importance of Christianity." "Jesus supplied, not so much new ethical precepts, as a new *direction* to the ethical life of man, and invested it with a new *power*." "He (Jesus) bases ethics entirely on the postulate of faith in God." "Jesus did not conceive of man as by nature separated from God—this idea was Greek in origin and reappears in Barthianism to-day." "Jesus held that man could lead the good life if he would while St. Paul held that man would lead the good life if he could. As one would expect the truer insight was with Jesus." (2) *The Validity of the Ethics of Jesus*: "Protestantism is more in line with the ethical teaching of Jesus than either Roman or Greek Catholicism, for it does not acknowledge two standards, but insists that there is one way of life for all Christians, be they clerics or laymen." "It is difficult to find a single ethical precept in the Gospels which can fairly be regarded as intended, and therefore valid, for the brief interval to which Weiss and Schweitzer refer (i.e., an interim-ethic)." "The notion that the so-called 'impossible' ideals are useless is clearly false . . . the ethical ideal of Jesus is an ideal only for the man who is in touch with the power of God, and who knows the Kingdom of God within." (3) *Paul as an Ethical Teacher*: "Paul is not to be regarded in any sense as an ethical philosopher, for he entered into no

discussion of ethical theories. Nor was he an ethical pioneer, for he did not create a new Christian ideal or a new Christian ethic—he simply passed on to others what he had received." "His (Paul's) ethic was realistic and far removed from the futilities of eremitism and monasticism. His passion was not to avoid contact with the world but to lead it back to God."

May these excerpts from the book sharpen your desire to read the book for yourself. It will be a very rewarding experience.

THOMAS S. KEPLER

Oberlin Graduate School of Theology

Devotion

Doctor Johnson's Prayers. Edited by ELTON TRUEBLOOD. New York and London: Harpers, [1945, 1947]. xxxv + 66 pages. \$1.50.

Professor Trueblood has performed an outstanding service for Christians and students of English literature (and sometimes the categories overlap) in editing this attractively printed edition of Doctor Johnson's prayers.

The typical picture of Doctor Johnson comes, of course, from Boswell. We see the literary dictator, dogmatically laying down the law, and overcoming opposition like a heavy tank. The other Johnson, seldom mentioned in the university classroom, comes into his own in the collection of prayers. We learn of the literary giant who prayed to be delivered from the sin of sloth, and who suffered such agonies at his wife's death that he prayed that he might have some dream or vision of her to console him. We know from his journal that when his mother's maid, Kitty Chambers, lay at the point of death he knelt by her bedside and prayed. Thanks to Prof. Trueblood, we now have at hand a prayer Doctor Johnson wrote for her—perhaps the one he said as he knelt beside her: 'Almighty and most merciful Father, whose loving-kindness is over all thy works, behold, visit, and relieve this thy Servant, who is grieved with sickness. Grant that the sense of her weakness may add strength to her faith, and seriousness to her Repentance. And grant that by the help of

thy Holy Spirit after the pains and labours of this short life, we may all obtain everlasting happiness through Jesus Christ our Lord, for whose sake hear our prayers. *Amen.* Our Father."

The example quoted above will illustrate the typical form of Doctor Johnson's prayers, and the obvious influence of the collects in *The Book of Common Prayer*. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that for combined purity of diction and majesty of phrasing, Doctor Johnson frequently equals the standard set by the service book of his church—and in so doing avoids the latinate heaviness of his typical prose style.

Professor Trueblood's introduction is a generous and discerning tribute to one of the most devout communicants of the Church of England during its eighteenth-century apathy. It should be required reading for any college course in "the age of Johnson."

CHAD WALSH

Beloit College

Anthropology and Religion

Santa Eulalia: the Religion of a Cuchumatán Town. By OLIVER LA FARGE. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947. xix + 211 pages. \$4.00.

Students of comparative religion as well as anthropologists will welcome the appearance of this book in which the author has undertaken the description and historical analysis of the religious beliefs and practices of a Maya Indian community of the western highlands of the Republic of Guatemala. The town of Santa Eulalia, selected for six months of field study in 1932, was a good choice for the investigation. The population is preponderantly Indian and thus has been less subject to the disorganizing impact of European culture. Furthermore, the community was known to be a ceremonial center in which ancient features of the Maya religion were still preserved.

In carrying out this study the author had two purposes in mind: the investigation of surviving elements of the aboriginal religion, and the study of the interesting fusion of Maya

and Christian religious practices which have become closely integrated. In the author's words: "The form and some of the content of Christianity have been grafted upon a fundamentally Indian religious philosophy, and a vast body of survivals has been brought under the sanctions of the Christian God. To some extent it may be said that these people . . . accepted God and the saints and then proceeded to convert them to the older religion."

One is struck by the extent to which religion pervades the everyday life of these people. Economic pursuits and the routine of daily living as well as the ever-frequent ritual and prayer are in great part guided by the Maya ceremonial calendar. Each day is ruled by a specific divinity whose power to help or hinder is known both to the older laymen as well as to the religious functionaries.

Ritual is by no means the exclusive province of the religious functionaries. There is a well-defined body of layman's ritual in which the majority of the elements of the more elaborate ceremonial are to be found. Layman's ritual centers around the family and house; the role of the family head approximates that of a priest.

The Santa Eulalians themselves make a distinction between Catholic Christian prayer and the more complex prayer ritual involving numerous aboriginal non-Christian elements. They use both forms of prayer.

A theocracy composed of religious personnel and the *principales* of the village, a group of men who have held religious offices, exercises a high degree of control over the community in matters of civil administration. The Guatemalan government has imposed a superordinate system of non-Indian administrators on the native system in this and other predominantly Indian communities; nonetheless civil and religious administration remain closely united.

The author treats all major aspects of religion in Santa Eulalia. Among the principal topics covered are layman's ritual, formal Christianity, formal non-Christian ceremonial,

native ceremonial organization, shamanism and magic, and the native calendar. Other significant aspects of culture are summarized in the introductory chapters. The materials are subjected to careful historical interpretation.

The synthesis of the Christian and native religions among the Indians of Middle America offers fascinating material for the study of the processes of acculturation. La Farge's study is an important addition to the literature in this field. Those who are concerned with missionary endeavors will find in this book an interesting evaluation of the role of Protestant missionaries among the Indians of this area.

GEORGE D. HOWARD

Boston University

Biography

Modern Christian Revolutionaries: An Introduction to the lives and thought of Kierkegaard, Eric Gill, G. K. Chesterton, C. F. Andrews, Berdyaev. Edited by DONALD ATTWATER. New York: Devin-Adair, 1947. xi + 390 pages. \$4.00.

After a certain time a book reviewer begins to think of himself as a creature who can pass only two judgments: "bad" and "good in spots." This present book is an exciting exception to the general rule that most books consume paper pulp that might better be used for making cereal cartons. *Modern Christian Revolutionaries* is easily one of the outstanding books of the year, and no one can read it without having his understanding of Christianity and its social implications sharpened and deepened.

In an introduction which is as searching as it is brief, Mr. Attwater gives his definition of "revolutionary"—"an advocate of principles and policies which involve dissociation from and reversal of established ways of thought, systems, etc." Speaking of Christianity, he says, "we have to look at the essence, not at the deformations, however gross and widespread and authoritative. And her fundamental moral principle is that each person, each sacred personality, must be responsible

for his own deeds and omissions—and without freedom there cannot be responsibility.”


Five more diverse Christians than those discussed in this book could scarcely be brought within one set of covers, but their Christianity makes them uniformly aware that not in man alone, organization alone, efficiency alone, nor respectability alone is the aim of life. The underlying unity between these men (two Roman Catholic, one Anglican, one Protestant, and one Orthodox) is one of the most striking evidences of the existence of the one invisible Church that a skeptic could ask for.

Melville Channing-Pearce makes Kierkegaard's existentialism—now so much to the fore—as clear as such a radically different system of thought can be made. He shows the uncompromising Dane fighting the eternal battle against “respectable religion,” and, as a last gesture, refusing on his deathbed to receive the last rites from the hands of a minister of the worldly established church.

Chesterton (discussed by F. A. Lea) and Eric Gill (discussed by the editor) had much in common—their membership in the Roman Church, their hatred of large-scale capitalism, their belief in decentralization. Both realized that socialism *by itself* is no solution for the abominations of capitalism. As Eric Gill said, “Merely to transfer ownership from private persons to the state is no revolution, it is only a natural development. Government by the proletariat is no revolution; it is only the natural sequel to the enfranchisement of lodgers.... And merely to proclaim an atheist government is no revolution—for that would be to make explicit what is already implicit in capitalist commercialism: but to return to Christianity would be truly revolutionary.”

Andrews (discussed by Nichol Macnichol) is famous for his association with Gandhi. His devotion to the interests of the Indian masses—his world-wide journeys to defend Indian immigrants from discrimination—invariably invite comparison with Albert

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Schweitzer and his outgoing Christian love for the exploited natives of Africa.

In view of our general ignorance of the Orthodox Church, the essay on Berdyaev by Evgueny Lampert is of especial interest. Berdyaev emerges as one of the keenest critics of atheistic communism, but profoundly hopeful that something of Christian value will emerge from it—that in its blind way it is trying to express the Christian doctrine of the mystical, organic unity of all mankind.

One hopes that Mr. Attwater will edit another book of this sort. Candidates for inclusion that come readily to mind are Dr. Schweitzer, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, and Dr. George MacLeod (head of the Iona Movement).

CHAD WALSH

Beloit College

Fiction

The Wall Between. By ELSIE OAKES BARBER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. 356 pages. \$2.75.

Much water has passed over the dam since Sinclair Lewis said the final word about clergymen in *Elmer Gantry*. It is now intellectually respectable to write a novel in which a minister is neither a fool nor a scoundrel. *The Wall Between* is one of the more interesting books of this sort to appear in recent years.

Mrs. Barber, the wife of a minister in Lawrence, Massachusetts, writes with an inside knowledge of parish life. One feels that her novel would be an excellent going-away gift to put in the handbag of a girl who has just married a minister. Everything is in it—the struggle against corrupt politics, the efforts to rescue a girl from her harlot mother, the campaign for better housing, difficulties with the leading members of the congregation.

Most of all, and most important for the orientation of a minister's wife, the book depicts the very real "wall between" the minister and his wife—he a devout believer, she the daughter of exceptionally unpleasant agnostics. The main thread of the plot is the heroine's slow progress toward an understand-

ing—and finally, a wholehearted acceptance—of her husband's faith.

The heroine is pictured with real psychological insight. The minister is much less clearly drawn. He is an admirable person, deeply devoted to God and to the social gospel sanctioned by God's teachings, but he does not come too fully alive. Willie Adams, the parking lot attendant, is much more real.

The Wall Between is a first novel, and shows some of the inevitable shortcomings of an initial venture in fiction. The style, especially in the first half of the book, is monotonous and talky. Toward the end, there is a marked improvement. The episode with the man on the bridge (pages 189-194) is written with such beauty and intensity that one thinks of Thomas Wolfe.

It always sounds like damning with faint praise to say that a first novel "shows promise," but one closes the book with that feeling. Mrs. Barber has written a sincere and competent novel, greatly superior to much of the current welter of religious fiction. Her next book should be much better than this one.

CHAD WALSH

Beloit College

The Eagle and the Cross. By PRINCE HUBERTUS ZU LOEWENSTEIN. New York: Macmillan, 1947. xii + 280 pages. \$2.75.

This novel is obviously inspired by genuine piety. The publishers, one suspect, were inspired neither by piety nor the illusion of having a literary masterpiece in their hands; all too clearly they are hoping to cash in on the current vogue of religious fiction.

With the solitary exception of Seneca, who seems to have flesh and blood, the characters in the novel are ambulatory puppets. The dialogue is as wooden as a children's Christmas pageant. The style alternates between journalese and purple passages that remind one of the early German romanticists.

To judge by this book, the author has almost none of the traits that go to make a novelist. But he has real abilities, which might better find expression in other literary forms. If,

instead of writing a third-rate novel about a young legionnaire who journeys to the Emperor's court to take him the lance that pierced Christ's side, he had given us a factual account of the prevalence of early Christianity among the upper strata of society he might have added greatly to our understanding of the first century. He might well write another book describing the amazingly "modern" life of the Romans, which included—if we can believe the novel—traveler's checks and a kind of telegraph. He might even write passable religious verse of the more sentimental kind. As it is, he has merely written another religious novel, and a poor one at that.

CHAD WALSH

Beloit College

Preaching

What is a Man? By ROBERT RUSSELL WICKS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 224 pages. \$2.75.

As Dean of the Chapel at Princeton Dr. Wicks has had dealings with several generations of students. Their problems were not to be trifled with. During the war and its aftermath these problems were accentuated and in this volume the author deals with them in what he calls a design for living that makes sense.

The foundation for this book was the Rockwell lectures on religious subjects delivered at Rice Institute, Houston, Texas. The themes of the lectures are (1) Our awareness of mystery; (2) Our two futures; (3) Our final dependence; (4) Our entanglement in necessities; (5) Our habit of self-defeat; (6) Our continuous conversion. Discussing the strategy of personal influence, Dr. Wicks asks, "Have we become obsessed with outward change as our salvation? How can a forgiving temper mitigate the conflicts of self-interest? How can we correct each other effectively?"

Here and there in the discussion illustrations are used, mainly drawn from life, and many of them are thought provoking. Here is a typical passage: "It should be a great relief to our

modern minds to know that we cannot make our own religious belief; for there is a widespread impatience with anyone inventing a religion to suit himself. No one dreams of inventing his own science. Our training has tempted us to think that we *first* must reason out what to believe and *then* believe our reason. We say we cannot induce ourselves to believe the unbelievable, which is of course true. But the fact is that something first strikes us as believable and then tries to understand what has struck us. Once there was a man who went down cellar in the dark to fix the furnace and, by accident, stepped on the upturned toe of a long iron poker which rose up and dealt him a terrific blow on his head. He did not create a belief in the poker. The poker attended to that; and then he called on his reason to *understand* what had hit him."

Illustrations are sometimes dangerous, and many passages in this book will doubtless lead to questions and objections. This may be one proof of its importance. People are destroyed through lack of knowledge; and the divine complaint in the first chapter of Isaiah is "My people do not think!"

JOHN GARDNER

New York City

Event In Eternity. By PAUL SCHERER. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1945. x + 234 pages. \$2.00.

A distinguished preacher, now Associate Professor of Homiletics in the Union Theological Seminary of New York, confesses that it took him nearly a quarter of a century to discover the so-called Second Isaiah: "I knew he was there; but I had always looked on the place where he lay and passed by on the other side." Now, however, the author has learned that "no other prophet speaks so intimately to our time from so great a height; nor any other more tenderly to our hearts from the heart itself of God." All who value the Bible as a valid source of light and truth, rather than simply as a proving-ground for critical ingenuity, should be grateful that a sensitive modern

interpreter here shares his rediscovery of the unknown singer who so hauntingly justified the ways of God to an age no less in agony than our own.

Although he is altogether conscious of the critical problems involved in any analysis of Isaiah 40-55 Professor Scherer wastes no time on peripheral matters. After a rapid but illuminating survey of Hebrew history and prophecy from the late eighth century to the Exile, he plunges into an exposition of the essential message of the prophet. The exposition takes the form of five essays or sermon-like meditations, each bearing a suggestive title: "The Glory and Majesty of God," "God in History," "The Eternal Purpose," "The God Who Would Be Man," and "The Divine Vocation." The whole adds up to Biblical, exegetical preaching at its best, a combination of penetrating insight into the prophetic imagery with profound theological inferences applicable to our contemporary crisis. It is a book for genuinely religious persons, scholars or not. The merely dispassionate student of religious thought will probably be but slightly edified.

It is impossible to summarize the rich and often discursive interpretation of Doctor Scherer in a paragraph or two. His central theme seems to be the reality of God's redemptive purpose and activity in history—"the pattern which spells in all its parts deliverance if you will let it." There is not much that is startlingly new in this treatment of an ancient faith, yet the faith needs to be reaffirmed in relevant terms for every latest generation, and the present book serves that function admirably. Although various readers may dissent from particular theological assumptions, the general exposition represents not only a fair and eloquent statement of Deutero-Isaiah but also a thrilling proclamation of the never-obsolete assurances of the Hebrew-Christian revelation. Insofar it may be of greater interest to preachers than to pedants.

LELAND JAMISON

Princeton University

In the Light of the Cross. By HAROLD COOKE PHILLIPS. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Cokesbury Press, 1947. 204 pages. \$1.75.

The author was invited to deliver the 1946 series of Jarrell Foundation Lectures at the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, during Ministers' Week. In this volume he gives us an expansion of those lectures with the addition of two chapters.

Why did men crucify Jesus? What motives inspired them to do a dreadful thing? Were those involved in the crime more grossly cruel or stupid than others? Many groups, many types of persons were involved. Dr. Phillips deals with the problem under the following heads: (1) Ecclesiasticism, represented by the Pharisees, good people, church people acting in good faith and unquestionably conscientious. (2) Privilege, the Sadducees, described as religious secularists. (3) Nationalism, Jesus' ideas of the kingdom of God came into head-on collision with his contemporaries' conception of the kingdom. The disappointed hopes of Israel found expression in Judas Iscariot. (4) Opportunism, in the person of Pilate. (5) Secularism, Herod Antipas. (6) Utilitarianism, represented by the soldiers. (6) Acquiescence, seen in the public.

In the light of these actors something was discovered to be at work. Together they seemed to be breaking a man. Actually they themselves were shown to be impotent against Goodness. They thought they were getting rid of a man; actually they were facing omnipotent Love.

Dr. Phillips is a great preacher. He belongs to the type which did mighty things forty or fifty years ago. Happy is the church and the city that has such men in the pulpit. He discusses an event of yesterday, but he fearlessly faces the same ideas and groups undoubtedly present in this year of our Lord. No one can read this book without being stirred to thought and action.

JOHN GARDNER

New York City

Book Notices

Alexander

Alexander of Macedon. The Journey to World's End.
By HAROLD LAMB. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946. 402 pages.

The story of Alexander and his conquests is of perennial interest. Well has it been said of him that "he lifted the civilised world out of one groove and set it in another; he started a new epoch; nothing could again be as it had been," a quotation cited by Mr. Lamb at the beginning of this volume. The constant reference to "oikoumene," the "inhabited world," throughout this fictional biography of Alexander serves to remind the reader that in a very real sense the youthful Macedonian conqueror was the originator of our "one world" concept. Alexander had in mind no mere extension of Greek city life, but a world state based upon Macedonian leadership and Persian genius for organization. It was to be a Eurasian state free of military control, since the military were to have no authority over public funds. Public funds were to be used mainly for development purposes, such as the building of Greek-type theaters and academies, new

highways, hospitals, fleets, and ports. Division of authority with Asiatics was carried to a degree which was irksome to the Macedonian leaders. Alexander's administration of conquered territories departed from military convention!

The character of Alexander is convincingly portrayed. Teachers of Syro-Palestinian history will be able to make use of the vividly told story of the six months' siege of Tyre.

A useful book for collateral reading in biblical or related courses.

Archaeology

The Legend of King Keret: a Canaanite Epic of the Bronze Age. By H. L. GINSBERG. (Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, Supplementary Studies, Nos. 2-3) New Haven: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1946. 50 pages, 2 Plates. \$1.00.

This is a study of one of the important epics contained on cuneiform tablets found at Ras Shamra in Syria. It contains a photograph of Keret A, cols. 1-3, and an enlarged photograph of col. 1; and also transliteration, translation, and commentary on the epic as a whole.

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Dr. Charles Leslie Venable is Pastor of Wicker Park Lutheran Church, Chicago, Ill.

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This little volume is welcome partly because of the scarcity in America of copies of the French journal in which the tablets have been published. The author suggests that it can be used by students as an introductory Ugaritic textbook, together with Gordon's grammar. Ginsberg is a recognized authority on Ugaritic matters, having published several years ago a translation of the texts then known into modern Hebrew, and since then many articles. The present epic has little direct bearing on Old Testament studies, but indirect bearing at a number of points.

Homiletics

Where the New World Begins. By JAMES REID. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Cokesbury Press, 1947. 218 pages. \$2.00.

James Reid is a British preacher of distinction. For years he wrote devotional articles for the *British Weekly*. Fifty-four of these articles comprise this volume. They are designed to express "those attitudes of mind and heart from which everything that is vital in the world ultimately proceeds." The average length of these chapters is less than four pages. Yet each theme is developed in a satisfying way; it is cultured, reasoned, penetrating, challenging, sane, and by no means remote from the problems, the doubts and fears which are pressing on multitudes today.

Dealing with Christ's words about Cross-bearing Dr. Reid asks how the picture can be translated into the terms of our prosaic and often comfortable lives? "We generally think of our cross as some hard burden or disability or frustration which life lays on us, and from which there is no escape—at least no escape which conscience will permit. . . . It may be that our burden comes from our own blindness or folly in other days. . . . We can bear the cross without denying ourselves. We can bear it grimly and stoically. Yet in our heart there may still be resentment, the self-will and pride that refuses the discipline it can offer. On the other hand we can use it to crucify pride, conquer self-will." Dr. Reid then tells the story from George Eliot's *The Mill on the Floss* of the young girl whose home life was one of long frustration. She was like a bird in a cage. She read Thomas à Kempis, "It flashed on her that all the miseries of her young life had come from fixing her heart on her own pleasure, as if that were the central necessity of the universe."

If so much can be so well said in seven minutes as these chapters show, college chapel might become once more the most eagerly awaited period of the day.

Miscellaneous

Services for the Open. Arranged by LAURA I. MATTOON and HELEN D. BRAGDON. New York Association Press, 211 pages, 1947. \$2.50.

This is a new printing of a widely used collection of

worship material for use in youth gatherings and other assemblies where open air services are held. It is dedicated "To those who have known God in the beauty and joy of days and nights lived in the fields and the woods." We should imagine that all whose task it is to make the programs for summer conferences would feel it an essential to their work.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons for 1947. New York: MacMillan Company, 1946. 408 pages. \$2.00.

Dr. Earl Leroy Douglass has for the last nine year prepared expositions of the International Sunday School Lessons. He has tried to prepare his lessons so that they can be used by all grades of teachers who follow the International scheme. He gives an introduction to the lessons for each quarter and tells how to use the lessons. Hints to Teachers are practical. The author is a capable scholar, writes in a clear and cultivated style. We can imagine many teachers finding the volume most useful.

Preaching the Word. By ROY L. SMITH. New York and Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947. 128 pages. \$1.00.

Dr. Roy L. Smith had won a reputation as one of the seven most representative American Methodist preachers before his appointment as editor of the "Christian Advocate" in 1940. The contents of this book were delivered as the first annual Peyton lectures at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University.

The dean of the school, Eugene B. Hawk, says, "Dr. Roy L. Smith was asked to prepare his messages with the idea of inspiring men to preach and showing them something of how it may be done. *Preach the Word* is not just another volume on homiletics." After a brief discussion on the choice of a title for his lectures taken from II Timothy which he regards as a second generation letter written, not by Paul but after all who had had contact with those who had known and heard Jesus during his earthly ministry had passed away, Dr. Smith develops his theme under four headings, The word of A. The prophets; B. The scholars; C. The apostles; D. The believers. His lectures are really sermons showing how a preacher does his work.

Dr. Roy Smith is a dramatic preacher. He begins by describing in vivid terms Jesus as a boy being taught by one whom he calls Rabbi Ben Ispah of the school of Hillel. Then he describes "The Beginning of the Word." "Naboth was in trouble: Far back in the shadowy days when the Hebrews were first getting a foothold in the Land of Promise—hundreds of years before—the founder of Naboth's family had settled upon a little tract of land not many miles from Nazareth, and had been confirmed in his title thereto by the elders of the clan. All generations of Nabothians since that time

had tilled the soil and drawn their living from its generosity."

What happened to Naboth is developed to show what compelled the prophets to speak, and what was the burden of their message. The same method in the development of his theme is followed in each lecture. Hence the book makes interesting and stimulating reading. The ministers and students who heard the lectures must have been impelled to more serious effort to instruct their people.

JOHN GARDNER

New York City

In the Secret Place of the Most High. By ARTHUR JOHN GOSSIP. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 210 pages. \$2.75.

Dr. Gossip here presents some studies in prayer. The table of contents indicates the scope of the discussion: (1) Our Real Trouble; And its Cure, (2) The First Law of Prayer, (3) Some Further Axioms and Postulates of Prayer, (4) The Characteristic Note of Christian Prayer, (5) The Prayer of Confession, and the Numbed Sense of Sin, (6) Thinking Magnificently about God; a Study in Adoration, (7) The Priestly Office of a Christian, (8) Some Problems Concerning the Prayer of Petition, (9) Some Methods of Prayer. It will be seen that the author is dealing with prayer as a serious undertaking. He faces his own problem and that of his fellows. In no realm of discussion does an author need more the prayer of the Psalmist, "Keep back thy servant from presumptuous sins." Dr. Gossip reveals a wide acquaintance with the writings of the mystics and fathers of the church. He is a stalwart Presbyterian yet deeply sympathizes with and understands the faith and practices of Roman Catholics. Throughout his book he never ceases to be a preacher addressing a congregation of people who need help and even rebuke and chastening. Often he uses long sentences but never gets lost in them. He is a preacher-poet. He is not afraid of using Scotch words. In the chapter "On a Study in Adoration" Dr. Gossip says: "In the Old Testament, for instance, this overpowering experience of the Presence, quite close, and unmistakably there, was not confined to sensitive spirits, like Isaiah on that grim day of gloom and mourning, when, to steady his staggered mind, he went to worship in the temple, and suddenly the whole place was, for him, filled with the glory of God; though those next him, probably enough saw nothing, felt nothing, rose up, and went their way much as they came, even, it may be, grumbling that it had been a dull service. . . . There was that crofter, or the like, called Gideon, crouching with no room for a full swing of the flails, seeking secretly to thresh a pickle of grain, which he had managed to grow and gather in some forgotten nook, that had escaped the vigilant eyes of the invaders, who were ruthlessly eating up the land. As

the man smote, his thoughts were bitter within him; till, straightening his stiff back, he looked up, and God, or God's messenger, was there. One never knew when it might happen. For always the divine was very near; and might burst in at any moment."

The minister who reads this book will approach his pulpit with a deeper sense of awe. The worshiper will cease to be casual in entering upon divine worship.

JOHN GARDNER

New York City

Child Psychology

The Child from Five to Ten. By ARNOLD GESELL and FRANCES L. ILG. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946. xii + 475 pages. \$4.00.

Readers of other books by Arnold Gesell and Frances Ilg, such as the companion volumes, *The Child from One to Five* and *The Infant and Child in the Culture of Today*, will have come to expect the same respect for carefully recorded data and the same caution with regard to the interpretation of, or generalization from, the facts. Aside from the doubtful exclusively physiological frame of reference which seems to be the ultimate base of explanation, one is happy to note even the attenuated study of the ethical development (in terms of personal and social growth), the philosophical development (in terms of the changing conception of time, space, the ego and world society), and the religious development (in terms of death and deity). This book provides not only a developmental description of motor activities, personal hygiene, emotional expression, fears and dreams, sex, social interplay, pastimes, school life, the ethical sense, and the philosophic outlook for each age from five to ten, but it also charts the development of each trait for the five years as a whole—always with the warning that the child's development be seen in the context of its own uniqueness.

The special values of these books to readers of this journal will be in revivifying the consciousness that development is a total process in which the specific ethical, religious, and philosophical changes are responses to and reflective of the developmental status of the individual. Our temptation is to regard the individual personality from the point of view of the final, mature product to be realized. There is still too much talk about what the five to ten year old (and other ages) need in the way of teaching, and not enough understanding of the problems which spring from the very fact of expansion and contraction in the physical and psychological needs of the growing person, and the rate of his intellectual development. As primary sources of developmental material and interpretations, these books are *musts* both for the parent, the teacher, the religious thinker and educator, and the philosopher of education.

PETER A. BERTOCCHI

Boston University

India

Richer by Asia. By EDMOND TAYLOR. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947. 432 pages \$3.75.

This book may well serve as collateral reading in an undergraduate history of religions course. The author gained a better understanding of himself and his own culture as a result of nearly three years spent in India during the last war. As he puts it, "perhaps even more important than the cultural elements which Asia can contribute to the foundations of a world community is the understanding of ourselves, of our own weaknesses and self-betrays, as well as our strengths, which the contrasts between our culture and the cultures of Asia brings to light . . ." (p. 9). This better understanding of oneself and one's own background is about what the present writer, at least, would hope to have his students gain from a study of other religions and other cultures. Such a book as this may help.

Mr. Taylor is a journalist with psychological interest and insight who was sent to India by the Office of Stra-

tegic Services, being assigned while there to Admiral Mountbatten's staff. "For two years he traveled widely in the Far East as deputy chief of clandestine activities for Mountbatten, as intelligence officer for the OSS, and finally as commanding officer of all OSS activities in the theater." This we learn from the publishers' statement.

His increasing awareness of how much "Richer by Asia" we might become is interestingly described in successive chapters. The chief barrier to this enrichment he found in what he calls "The Pathology of Imperialism." Increase of religious awareness is portrayed in the section labelled "A Quiet Visit with the Gods." Mr. Taylor succeeds remarkably well in getting inside "the pantheist mood." He came to recognize the social role of mysticism—through the guru—in Hindu life. Buddhism, he discovered, has a positive meaning in its context.

This book is not the usual type of travel book. Its reader is likely himself to feel much "Richer by Asia" as a result of reading it.

REVELATION AND REASON

(Continued from page 20)

18. Hendrik Kraemer, *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World*, p. 107.
19. Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 388.
20. Augustine, *Epistle* 120:3.
21. Brunner, *op. cit.*, p. 427.
22. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV, xix, 4.
23. Edgar P. Dickie, *Revelation and Response*, p. 106.
24. William Temple, in Baillie and Martin (eds.), *Revelation*, p. 122; cf. p. 99.
25. A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, II, p. 81.
26. Walter M. Horton, in Baillie and Martin (eds.), *Revelation*, p. 258.
27. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation*, p. 93.
28. Walter M. Horton, *op. cit.*, pp. 260f., 258, n. 2.
29. Richard Kroner, *The Primacy of Faith*, p. 203.
30. Millar Burrows, *An Outline of Biblical Theology*, p. 36.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF FAITH AND REASON

(Continued from page 45)

16. *Ibid.* pp. 278-280; Russell, SO, pp. 107-108.
17. "Notes on Scientific Philosophy," in D. J. Bronstein, *Basic Problems of Philosophy*, p. 309.
18. *Ibid.*, 301.
19. *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, p. 39.
20. *La Science et l'Hypothese*, p. 171; tr. follows Halsted's.
21. Northrop, F.S.C., *The Meeting of East and West*, p. 297, rightly stresses this limitation on our knowledge; cf. Trueblood, LB, 44, 47.
22. *A Philosophy of Religion*, p. 258.
23. Cf. Northrop, MEW, pp. 294-300.
24. Dickinson S. Miller; quoted in Brightman, POR, p. 121.
25. Locke, *Essay*, IV, xix, 4; parenthetical statement mine.